SCSS#10, 19 July 2022: Russia and China in Central Asia Mark Galeotti Jul 21 This is a summary of the discussion at the latest workshop of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 19 July 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. Please note that Mark Galeotti is only hosting these useful summaries and can claim no credit for compiling them. Introduction Between 2001 and 2013 multivectorism in Central Asia was incubated by a competitive external context. After 9/11 the US expanded security partnerships, bases, security assistance and logistics agreements with the Central Asian states. At the same time, the global financial crisis facilitated China’s economic rise and Russia’s retrenchment; Russia promoted a “unite and influence” strategy that aimed to induct Central Asian states into its regional organizations and initiatives.  In 2014 a strategic reassessment took place, the trend was away from multivectorism towards a Russia-China condominium arrangement: the US gradually drew down its military presence in Afghanistan and the region; the Crimea “ripple effect” took hold; and, China advanced its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and “Community of Friendly Neighbors” narrative. The glue that holds the Russia-China condominium together in Central Asia is the need to demonstrate public solidarity against the U.S.-led liberal world order.  This translates regionally into efforts to jointly exclude the US from Central Asian affairs. Both Russia and China seek to confront the EU and NATO from a position of geopolitical and geo-economic strength.  Russia accepts China’s asymmetric economic power and relates to BRI as if it is in Russia’s interests. Both states also support post-Western global governance through coordinating contacts among new regional bodies such as Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), BRI, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as alternative non-Western, if not wholly yet anti-Western, architecture which seeks to promote a changing international order and oppose Western values, media, education and civil society support and engagement.  Allied to anti-Westernism is the real shared fear in Moscow and Beijing of political instability or “chaos”, civil unrest or regime changes. Can we assume that a stable condominium is a given, that Russia can act as the sheriff and China as the banker to the region?  Or do growing power disparities between the two suggest that as China’s reach increases, Russia’s diminishes?  Will Moscow in fact resist the designated “junior partner” role and seek to hedge against it?  Or does Russia’s growing anxiety and insecurity push it towards China and Chinese positions, leading to a softening of its own red lines, even as China defers to Russian talking points in public?  How might Russia start to view the region in its evolving geopolitical imagination?  What is Central Asia’s role in the ‘Russian World’? What are the views from the Central Asian states themselves and how might they maneuver in this new reality? Multivector Shocks Commentators such as Bobo Lo who have viewed the Russia-China partnership as an “axis of convenience” or as a pragmatic coalition have still predicted that Central Asia is an area of the world where rifts between Moscow and Beijing could be exposed.  But every time the region faces some sort of crisis or shock, Russia and China seem to support and accommodate each other’s unilateral and even destabilizing actions. Nonetheless, the belief that a Russia and China clash in Central Asia is inevitable refuses to die. We can illustrate this contention that crises in Central Asia promote condominium consolidation rather than culmination by looking back at three regional shocks from the last year.  First, joint reactions to US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the denial of residual basing rights to the US to facilitate this withdrawal.  If we compare Chinese and Russian priorities we see some are shared, and, perhaps more importantly, none are incompatible. China’s priorities include: pushing for other countries to lift their sanctions against the interim Taliban government and engage; pressure the Taliban to cooperate on its own border security priorities, making in the process Wakhan “Iron Wall” relocation and possible deportation of Afghanistan’s 2000+ Uyghurs; offer humanitarian aid (food and vaccines) and promises of infrastructure investment and BRI expansion to align with Beijing’s priorities (most recently post-earthquake); and, demand that the US unblocks Afghan assets. Russian priorities include: continued calls for preparedness and collective security between the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), evidenced by border drills and the provision of weaponry; Russia and CSTO member states have reaffirmed their position to not accept Afghan refugees on their territory or in transit; advocating for pragmatism with the Taliban (including the creation of as de facto Taliban embassy in Moscow) and a Russian role in regional solutions, while excluding the US.  In the absence of the US, Central Asian governments, (except Tajikistan) have adopted a pragmatic approach to the Taliban.  They have backed Russian and Chinese regional security and economic initiatives, adopted Russia and CSTO member state position to not accept Afghan refugees on their territory or in transit and denied US basing access during withdrawal. Second, China accommodating itself and then publicly supporting the Russian-led CSTO intervention during protests in Kazakhstan in January 2021.  This demonstrates that bothRussia and China view regional security as the defense of autocratic regimes.  The SCO supported CSTO actions taken to stabilize the situation. Indeed, President Xi Jinping on the 30th Anniversary of Relations “Joining Hands for a Shared Future” on 25 January 2022 clearly stated: “We firmly oppose attempts by external forces to foment color revolutions in Central Asia, firmly oppose interference in other countries’ internal affairs under the pretext of human rights, and firmly oppose any force that tries to disrupt the tranquil life of the people in this region.” Third, China’s public support for Russia’s “international ordering” claims and grievances as they have been used to justify its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This is despite a disruptive sanctions regime (which Chinese companies with a global orientation appear to be complying with) and the disruption of the land belt transportation routes that have been a key feature of China’s BRI in Eurasia. There is deep concern among post-Soviet states about both Russia’s war and subsequent western sanctions, particularly regarding compliance risk and secondary sanctions. None of the post-Soviet EAEU states have joined the sanctions, though members of the EAEU face the shock of integration disruptions.  All Central Asian states face declining remittances (20-40% of GDP) from migrant workers in Russia. Energy exporters face difficulties in accessing markets (reduction of Kazakhstani oil in Caspian Pipeline Consortium) and a halt in Trans-Eurasian Integration: over 1 million containers are diverted from Eurasian Rail (BRI land belt) to Maritime Cargo. Russia and Central Asia: Rhetoric and Structural Realities? Much of the current discussion of Russia-China in Central Asia suggests that (i) Russia will rapidly lose influence to China and other powers in the aftermath of Ukraine; and (ii) that as China increases its influence in Central Asia, wedges will emerge in the Russia-China relationship, testing the alignment between Beijing and Moscow. Both these conclusions are misleading. Current circumstances provide the opportunity for central Asian states to reassert their authority and by either necessity or choice engage with a range of extra-regional middle powers, including Turkey, Iran, the Gulf states, South Korea, Japan and India. The US perceives India as a potentially useful counterweight to China in South and Central Asia, but India is hampered by a lack of leverage, ongoing competition with Pakistan and a hedging policy that demands cooperative relations with Russia.  How can we challenge the notion that Russia faces overstretch and in Central Asia is in retreat, ceding influence to China? First, talk of Russia’s imminent ‘decolonisation’ and ‘roll-back’ of Russia’s sphere of influence from Central Asia is much exaggerated. Russian influence may be reduced – but it is far from finished. The biggest hit is in Russian economic influence. Sanctions are already taking a toll on Russian investments and financial ties in Central Asia. The World Bank estimates that remittances sent home by Tajik migrant laborers from Russia might drop by around 40%.  Trade has shifted from Russia’s Trans-Siberian rail route to the ‘Middle Corridor’ through Central Asia and the Caspian (volumes are six times as big as last year). And a smaller Russian economy (at least 8% smaller by year-end) means a smaller market for Central Asian exports. But structural realities mean that Russia will still play a key role: the axiom ‘geography is destiny’ holds true in Central Asia.  Geography dictates that traders and migrants have few choices. Migrants are used to financial and political fluctuations and have well-established coping mechanisms and will adjust to the ‘new normal’. While sanctions will create headaches for Central Asian companies and traders, they also offer opportunities. Although governments insist that they will comply with US and Western sanctions on Russia, in the grey-zone that is Central Asia, the region is still likely to play a role in sanctions evasion, providing a platform for Russia’s continued economic, financial and technological engagement with the Global South. For example, on 28 June the US Treasury designation of Uzbekistan’s Promkomplektlogistic company. The US claimed the company was actively supporting sanctioned Russian company Radioavtomatika to evade US sanctions on sourcing high-tech foreign components). One hundred thousand Russian IT specialists as individuals and as employees in companies can relocate to Tbilisi, Yerevan, Almaty and Tashkent, emergent technology hubs in post-Soviet space, stretching the meaning of sanctions evasion by utilizing hitherto dormant EUAU enabling legal legislation. Beyond economics, Russia’s security offer for the region remains more or less intact. It is true that China’s security presence in “Greater Central Asia” has increased, particularly in Tajikistan.  China takes part in the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM), established in 2016 as a four-way Anti-Terror Coordinating Structure (with Russia and the US excluded).  According to the 2016 Summit declaration, its purpose is: “to coordinate with and support each other in a range of areas, including study and judgment of counter-terrorism situation, confirmation of clues, intelligence sharing, anti-terrorist capability building, joint anti-terrorist training and personnel training.” China’s influence is also boosted by the role of private security companies (PSC’s) as BRI-related companies contract with Chinese PSCs to provide security. “Security” includes both physical dimensions (personal) but also surveillance and new technologies. If we extrapolate forward, might one implication be a growing power asymmetry with the condominium and Russia being relegated to “junior partner” status?  It is true that Russia’s military prestige has been undermined by the failures in its war in Ukraine. However, the kind of limited intervention that Russia offers to Central Asia – 2,500 troops intervened in Kazakhstan in January 2022 for example, or 7,000 men at its base in Tajikistan – remain important for Central Asian states. There is no sign that Russia is planning to draw down troops from Tajikistan or elsewhere in the region. Moreover, China’s militarization of Xinjiang spillover negatively with publics in Central Asia, if not formally with state elites. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states are placed by China on a 26 “sensitive countries” list: China targets those spending time overseas and divided families.  The so-called reeducation camps mobilize civil society and promote transnational campaigns, social media protests, and international press scrutiny, making it increasingly difficult for the Kazakh government to balance Beijing’s demands with public opinion. China’s ‘clamp down’ in Xinjiang adds to collective fears about Chinese power and intentions. Neither China nor any other regional power has the interest or capacity to fulfil Russia’s security role. Central Asian states have growing security ties with China, but still buy 80% of their weapons from Russia. That kind of dependence will not shift rapidly – although in a sign of where things might be heading, the Kyrgyz are buying Turkish drones, and the Tajiks Iranian ones. But on security, there is no serious competition. China supported Russia’s stabilization mission in Kazakhstan in January 2022 and Russia shows little concern about China’s security presence on the Tajik-Kazakh border. Both states have similar views on conflicts in the region. Both, for example, support crackdowns on the kind of unrest seen in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) region in May or in Karakalpakstan (Nukus) in Uzbekistan in early July 2022. Russia’s information dominance and traction in society also remains significant. Polls show Central Asian societies polarized on the war – although sympathy for Russia remains strong. In Kazakhstan, one poll showed 39% supported Russia and 10% supported Ukraine, while 46% professed neutrality. Though support for Ukraine was much higher among Kazakh-speakers, residual support for Russia is still present across the region.  In a 2021 poll by the Central Asia Barometer Group only 4.9 % of respondents in Kazakhstan cited China as the country most able to help address ‘economic and other problems’. Even fewer in Uzbekistan (2.6%) thought China would help.  Even lower numbers pointed to the US – although the EU did get some support (5.7% in Uzbekistan and 11.1% in Kazakhstan). Russia, on the other hand, was the country perceived as most likely to provide assistance for 54.3% of respondents in Kazakhstan and 53.9% in Uzbekistan. There is no sign that Russia is giving up on its regional dominance – although it may be willing to share with China. Geography and history dictate that Russia is unlikely to retreat willingly from Central Asia. Russia is incapable of defending its 5,000-mile border with Kazakhstan. It is – as so often in its imperial history – forced into forward positions to defend its security – and still views the Tajik-Afghan border as essential to its security. Ceding security dominance of the region to an external power – even a friendly power such as China – is not compatible with current Russian thinking on its security. This perceived threat becomes even more acute if Russian influence is replaced not by China but by Turkey and Western powers. Indeed, for Russia the major perceived security threat in the region is probably not from China, but from Turkey. In this sense, China is more of an ally for Russia, than an opponent, hence the alignments. In reality, without Central Asia, Russia is no longer a Great Power – so it is not surprising that Putin’s first international visit after the start of the war was to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Russia’s spatial vision of the ‘Russian World’ attracts headlines because it appears to drive much of the thinking on Ukraine. But in geopolitical terms, it is Eurasia that has been the most productive spatial imaginary for Russia. It serves as the platform for Russia’s claim to be a global power – a pole in a multipolar world. A vision of Russia at the center of Greater Eurasia allows Moscow to dream of an important geopolitical role in a swathe of geography from Northern Europe to South Asia (“from Murmansk to Mumbai”). Without a leading role in Central Asia, this idea of a Greater Eurasia – and Moscow’s role in the world – looks even more fantastical. The biggest challenge for Russia is not economic or military but ideological. President Toqaev’s apparent on-stage trolling of President Putin at the St Petersburg Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2022 was widely publicized as a rift. But in reality Central Asian leaders agree with Putin on plenty. Like Putin, they run authoritarian political systems, are unforgiving towards opposition or liberal values, and see the West as a threat to stability. But they will find it very difficult to manage a Russia in which the ideology is not authoritarian modernization but imperial nationalism. Despite the fact that Putin’s regime legitimizes itself through continuous reference to the Soviet Victory in the Great Patriotic War, Putin, who was in fact a real “red” Soviet colonel in the late Soviet period, behaves as an imaginary “white” tsarist general in the Russian Civil War. His actions in Ukraine (asserting that Ukraine is not a state and Ukrainians are not a people) are not so much post-Soviet as anti-Soviet. Russian anti-Ukraine rhetoric is too Slavic, too Orthodox, too Russian imperial, belligerent to gain traction. Indeed, Russian exterminationist rhetoric repels. Russian nationalists have reacted badly to decisions by Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan not to hold 9 May victory parades and bans on the symbols ‘Z’ and ‘V’. In April the Russian newspaper MK claimed that Kyrgyz-Russian relations were threatened by US official visits to Bishkek and claimed that Moscow was preparing ‘severe’ measures against any potential ‘stab in the back’. There is no sign – yet – that such ideological paranoia is driving Kremlin thinking on Central Asia. But a further Russian turn to violent neo-imperialist thinking might also start to imperil the peaceful coexistence of Russia and China in Central Asia. Conclusions: Almost uniquely among Great Powers, Russia and China define Central Asia as a “common adjacent region” one in which they can coordinate and cooperate to manage disputes ultimately through Xi-Putin dialogue.  Crises in Central Asia promote the consolidation of the condominium rather than its culmination. Despite Western predictions of drift, Moscow and Beijing are aligned on Central Asian crisis situations: Afghanistan; Kazakhstan’s protests; Ukraine and Western sanctions. Such alignment is more than an axis (non-aggression pact) but less than an alliance.  This alignment acknowledges that Russia remains the region’s core security provider. Central Asian states retain a strong preference for multivectorism.  While their proximity to Russia and China creates challenges, current circumstances provide them with the opportunity to reassert their authority and engage with a range of extra-regional middle powers, including Turkey, Iran, the Gulf states, South Korea, Japan and India. The political West needs to articulate not only what it seeks to prevent, but what it is for in dealing with Central Asian partners.  The West should avoid forcing governments to “pick sides”.  It should acknowledge its “hidden power” which is based on human capital – education, training, professional standards, and technocratic networks and a more attractive modernization paradigm when set against Russia’s return to imperial history or the “Chinese Dream”. GCMC, 20 July 2022. Disclaimer: This summary reflects the views of the authors (Alexander Cooley, David Lewis and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments. Comment Like You can also reply to this email to leave a comment. Trouble clicking? Copy and paste this URL into your browser: https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2022/07/21/scss10-19-july-2022-russia-and-china-in-central-asia/

Update 10 Lutkemeerpolder – Voedselpark Amsterdam 18 juli 2022 Bekijk de webversie Volg je ons al op LinkedIn? We zitten sinds vorige maand ook op Linkedin, waar we inmiddels ruim 500 volgers hebben. Kom je er ook bij? Volg ons hier. verdieping Je hebt al even geen nieuwsbrief ontvangen, maar dat betekent allerminst dat wij stilzitten. We werken momenteel aan de uitbreiding en verdieping van het plan voor Voedselpark Amsterdam. Onze aftrap was begin juni tijdens ons stadsgesprek in Pakhuis de Zwijger. Afgelopen week organiseerden we een expertmeeting over Voedselpark als een belangrijke schakel in een regionaal regeneratief voedsel en landbouwsysteem voedsel en logistiek. concretisering Om nog meer mensen te overtuigen van het belang van het behoud van de Lutkemeerpolder werken de mensen van Voedselpark Amsterdam met een groep professionals, wetenschappers en ondernemers aan een verdere concretisering van Voedselpark Amsterdam. Hierbij staan de sociale en ecologische doelen van het Voedselpark uiteraard voorop. Dit plan willen we na de zomer presenteren aan politiek en achterban. We houden je op de hoogte via onze website, socials en deze nieuwsbrief. Lutkemeer in Parool ‘Een Voedselpark kan alleen op deze plek’ Onlangs stonden we groot in Het Parool: ‘De strijd tegen de bouw van distributiecentra in de groene Lutkemeerpolder heeft een nieuwe wending gekregen door het plan voor een Voedselpark langs de rand van Osdorp. Misschien zelfs in combinatie met een bedrijventerrein. ‘Eten verbindt over het algemeen.’’   Lees het artikel hier terug. expertmeeting over voedsel en logistiek Afgelopen week spraken we experts op het gebied van stedenbouw, logistiek, korte keten en urban ecologie. Doel was het realiseren van een onderbouwde uitwerking van ons  Voedselpark plan Amsterdam, als weerwoord op plannen van de gemeente.  De focus lag op de verbinding tussen het lokaal duurzaam voedsel en logistiek. Dit sluit aan bij vraagstukken en doelen waar de gemeente zich ook mee bezig houdt: lokale consumptie van 5 naar 25 %; stimuleren van de korte keten; nieuwe voedselhubs in en om de stad; nieuwe trends in de stadslogistiek als fast delivery en dark kitchens. Het was een vruchtbare bijeenkomst. De aanwezige experts bevestigden allemaal het belang van Voedselpark en zien de noodzaak voor Amsterdam en de regio. De deelnemers hebben hun ondersteuning toegezegd en daar ook meteen actie aan verbonden. We gaan een stedenbouwkundig plan uitwerken, daarbij geholpen door stedenbouwkundige Danny Edwards van Blau. Er worden contacten gelegd met logistieke partners en binnen onderwijsinstellingen. We zoeken nog een planeconoom die kan uitrekenen wat de kosten zijn voor het beëindigen van het bestaande contract en de opstarten van een nieuw plan. We doen ons best om na de vakantie een preview te presenteren. English Working out the Plan It’s been a while since you’ve heard from us, which in no way means we haven’t been terrible active. We are currently working on expanding and elaborating the plan for Food Park Amsterdam. Our kick-off was at the start of June during our town hall meeting at Pakhuis de Zwijger. Last week we organized an expert meeting to discuss Food Park as an important link in a regional regenerative food and farming system. To underscore the importance of preserving Lutkemeer polder and convince even more people, we at Food Park Amsterdam are working with a group of professionals, scientists and entrepreneurs to bring the initiative to more concrete stages. With the social and ecological goals of the Food Park being leading, we are hoping to present this plan to politicians and supporters after the summer. We will keep you informed via our website, socials and this newsletter. New-West Borough The realization of Food Park Amsterdam is one step closer, following a majority vote of all political parties represented on the borough of New West (Stadsdeel Nieuw-West), who requested an independent feasibility study be conducted with regard to Food Park Amsterdam. The parties have requested the Municipal Executive to explore financial options for buying up the Lutkemeer polder and developing a food park at this location. Expert meeting Last week we met up with experts in the field of urban planning, logistics, short supply chains and urban ecology in order to work on a well substantiated response to plans by the municipality. We emphasized the connection between local sustainable food and logistics, which is also aligned with issues and objectives that the municipality has committed to: local consumption up from 5% to 25%; stimulating short supply chains new food hubs in and around the city new trends in city logistics such as fast delivery and dark kitchens This was an encouraging meeting in which all experts confirmed the importance of Food Park, acknowledging Amsterdam and the larger region need such a programme. The participants have pledged their support and have followed up with immediate actions: we are going to develop an urban plan, assisted by Danny Edwards of Blau Urban Planners (Halfweg). We are reaching out to logistics partners and educational institutions. We are looking for a specialist in plan economy who will be able to calculate the costs of terminating the existing contract and starting a new plan. We are hoping to present a preview after the summer holidays. Englis below We are happy to include a summary of this newsletter in English as many of our English speaking supporters have expressed the wish to be kept up to date. We zijn heel blij met de ruim 4.250 medestanders die samen al meer dan € 421.000 hebben gedoneerd. Help ons om meer mensen te bereiken. Laat weten dat jij hebt gedoneerd en deel deze link! direct doneren Hulp bij lobby en organisatie Er ligt ongelofelijk veel werk, waar we na de zomer alleen mee door kunnen gaan als zich nieuwe vrijwilligers aanmelden. We zoeken doeners die minimaal 4 uur per week tijd hebben om zich als vrijwilliger aan ons te binden: * een projectmanager die ons wil ondersteunen bij organisatorische zaken * mensen die zich willen inzetten voor onze lobby richting de politiek * mensen met financiële expertise die willen helpen bij ons businessplan Interesse? Mail dan naar info@voedselparkamsterdam.nl Steun van je bedrijf of organisatie? Heel graag! Al meer dan 200 bedrijven en organisaties hebben zich achter Voedselpark Amsterdam geschaard. Bekijk hier onze presentatie voor bedrijven. Lees wie ons al steunen en hoe jouw bedrijf of organisatie ons kan helpen. Agenda Voedselpark Amsterdam (alle activiteiten zijn naast boerderij de Boterbloem, Lutkemeerwg 262-b, 1067 TH – verzamelen om 13 uur op het terras van de boerderijwinkel, tenzij anders vermeld) Zondag 31 juli Lutkemeerpolder natuurwandeling Een korte wandeling voor jong en oud, onder leiding van de bevlogen natuurgids Gert Snoei en natuurliefhebber Iris Poels. Je hoort meer over de natuurwaarden van de polder en over de stand van zaken bij Voedselpark Amsterdam.  Zaterdag 17 september Oogstfeest in de Lutkemeer De gezamenlijke bedrijven Boterbloem, Pluk!, Stadsgroenteboer en de Tuinakker organiseren een oogstfeest. Kom kijken wat de Lutkemeerpolder nu al kan opleveren en hoe we dat met Voedselpark kunnen opschalen. Steun stadsdeel Nieuw West Het Voedselpark Amsterdam is een stapje dichterbij, na een besluit in de Amsterdamse politiek. Er moet een onafhankelijk onderzoek komen naar de financiële haalbaarheid van Voedselpark Amsterdam. Daartoe heeft stadsdeelcommissie Amsterdam Nieuw-West in meerderheid per motie opgeroepen. Een meerderheid van de politieke partijen, waaronder coalitiepartij D66, heeft geschaard achter een motie over de Lutkemeerpolder van oppositiepartijen GBP en FVD. De partijen verzoeken het college van B&W de financiële mogelijkheden te verkennen om de Lutkemeerpolder op te kopen en daar een voedselpark te ontwikkelen.   Het huidige college van B&W heeft de groene Lutkemeerpolder opgegeven voor een bedrijventerrein en stelt dat aan het ontwikkelen van een Voedselpark een prijskaartje hangt van 42 miljoen euro. Voedselpark Amsterdam betwist dit bedrag en pleit voor een gedegen onderzoek.   Dat nu ook bestuurspartij D66 een onderzoek naar de financiële haalbaarheid wil laten uitvoeren, juicht Voedselpark Amsterdam dan ook van harte toe. ‘Stadsdeel Nieuw-West ziet wél in hoe belangrijk het Voedselpark is. De lokale politiek lijkt daarmee te luisteren naar de wens van de burger, die dit mooie stuk vruchtbare landbouwgrond niet wil opgeven aan de bulldozers, maar een nieuwe, groene functie wil geven’, zegt Natasha Hulst, woordvoerder namens Voedselpark. Terugblik op stadsgesprek in Pakhuis de Zwijger Op 2 juni was ons stadsgesprek in samenwerking met Pakhuis de Zwijger; met 150 aanwezigen een prachtige opkomst. Het was een mooie avond. De sprekers wisten tijdens twee panels goed uit te leggen dat het voor de gemeente én de generatie na ons een enorme kostenpost wordt om in de Lutkemeer een distributiecentrum aan te leggen. Bovendien is het met de huidige geopolitiek dom en gevaarlijk, was de heersende opinie, om vast te houden aan een achterhaald idee, terwijl lokale stabiele voedselsystemen nodig zijn. Kees Willem Rademakers, expert in Voedsel Logistiek, stelde dat Lutkemeerpolder een belangrijke schakel zou kunnen worden in een regionale voedselsysteem.    Onze vrienden van Land van Ons vertelden genoeg middelen te hebben om de grond te kunnen kopen, mits voor de waarde van landbouwgrond. Ze vertelden ook dat ontwikkelaar SADC open staat voor alternatieven (combinaties van landbouw en groen bedrijventerrein), maar dat zij wachten op de gemeente. Ook hoorden we dat op 2 km afstand, in Lijnden, het distributiecentrum City Logistic Innovation Campus komt, wat veel logischer ligt gezien de infrastructuur.   Het stadsgesprek met zoveel Amsterdammers was een opsteker voor het team achter Voedselpark. Er werd ook opgeroepen om onze focus te verbreden en te verdiepen. Volgens sommige aanwezigen moeten er niet één maar vier voedselparken komen. Al met al een leerzame en energieke avond, waar we nieuweenergi en ideeën hebben opgedaan. Via een polderveiling hebben we fondsen opgehaald voor onze campagne. Ook hebben zich nieuwe vrijwilligers aangemeld. Het was, zo vlak na de start van het nieuwe college van B&W, ook de start van een nieuwe fase waarin we veel nieuwe kansen zien.     De AT5-uitzending terugkijken? Dat kan hier.   Dankjewel voor je donatie aan Voedselpark Amsterdam! We hebben deze in goede orde ontvangen. Met deze nieuwsbrief willen we je op de hoogte houden. We kunnen nog alle hulp gebruiken om de campagne voort te zetten de komende weken. Hoe je kunt helpen vind je op onze website. Contact Het kernteam is te bereiken via info@voedselparkamsterdam.nl Volg ons Website LinkedIn Twitter YouTube Facebook Instagram

Beste Radio, Alle oproepen aan de overheid om te stoppen met het subsidiëren van de fossiele industrie hebben niks opgeleverd. Het is tijd voor de volgende stap: een belastingstaking voor het klimaat! 5% van de overheidsuitgaven naar fossiele subsidies? Niet met ons geld. Bezorgde burgers gaan daarom bezwaar maken tegen 5% van de inkomstenbelasting. Doe mee met de belastingstaking! En kom vrijdag naar Den Haag om je te laten zien en horen bij de lancering! Aanmelden (niet verplicht) voor de lancering: www.belastingstaking.nl/lancering Wil je al eerder beginnen? Maak dan nu bezwaar op www.belastingstaking.nl Lancering: Ministerie van Financiën, Korte Voorhout 7 Den Haag, 12.00 – 13.00 uur Met onder andere een optreden van Bjeno Vlot. De manifestatie is aangemeld bij de gemeente.   💚Liefde, woede en solidariteit💚 Extinction Rebellion   💗💗💗💗💗💗💗💗💗💗💗💗💗

 

Mark Galeotti posted: ” This is a summary of the discussion at a workshop emerging from the Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars, that was held in Berlin on 24 May 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Par” In Moscow’s Shadows SCSS Berlin Workshop, 24 May 2022 Summary Mark Galeotti May 29 This is a summary of the discussion at a workshop emerging from the Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars, that was held in Berlin on 24 May 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. Please note that Mark Galeotti is only hosting these summaries and can claim no credit for compiling them. Session 1:     Beijing-Moscow-Kyiv: Strategic Lessons Learned and Denied? Russian blunders in Ukraine are rooted in pre-existing and deep-seated strategic, military and political cultures.  These blunders result in a contradictory “fluid stalemate”, as well as exhausted and degraded Russian forces. Official “everything going according to plan” propagandist narratives do not allow for, let alone incentivize, innovative results-orientated approaches: Russia cannot learn from defeats that it does not recognize. In a “battle of resilience”, Ukraine is winning.  If the war continues for 3 more months, there is no need for US troops to reinforce Europe. Russia’s leadership cannot learn any potential “lessons” identified in Donbas operations between 2014 and 2022 as engagements here were officially denied.  In Syria Russian Aerospace Forces operated in parallel with Syrian and Iranian, not Russian, ground forces and so there are no combined arms “lessons” to be learned and applied. Instead, Russia falls back on existing tactics and strategy which stress positional mass artillery barrages though Ukraine adopts a more dynamic fire and move approach. Greater Russian firepower cannot compensate for less Russian manpower.  Kinzhal is not decisive as the arsenal too limited and targeting is uncertain; Russia lacks the essential ability to integrate different strike capabilities. The orderly retreat from Kyiv – days ahead of what would have been a route – highlight some adaptive ability.  Putin’s decision not to declare “special operation” as “war” on 9 May and order full mobilization also demonstrates an ability still to surprise, as does Russia’s “mellow” response to Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO. From a Russian perspective, China’s footprint in its “special operation” is apparent in three respects: 1) poor equipment supplies which speak more to corruption than cooperation; 2) a degree of political trust that allows Russia to accept the risk of deploying ground troops from the Far Eastern Military District to Ukraine; and, 3) as Russia’s war in Ukraine is in part designed to causes the final collapse of the Western liberal international rules-based order so highlighting Russia’s great power – China’s withdrawal of support or the continued existence of that order challenges this foundational legitimizing Russian narrative. The 4 February 2022 “no limits friendship” joint declaration noted that the “fate of states are interconnected”. This fits into the Chinese view that there is no existence without coexistence.  It reiterated respect for statehood and non-interference in domestic affairs and stated that the liberal international order needed to be transformed, though within the UN framework and International Law.  For China the end state is a “common destiny of mankind” which places US and China as peers, affording each other mutual respect and enjoying peaceful coexistence. In reality, the CCP understands Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in terms of: 1) legitimate Russian security interests; 2) Russia’s need to suppress a “Nazi” Ukrainian regime – even if Putin wrongly assessed the Ukrainians themselves would perceive this as “liberation”; and, 3) as a proxy war which validates Chinese assumptions around a confrontational US and NATO wedded to Cold War thinking. China reinforces Russia’s social media framing of the invasion as a Western neo-colonial struggle which Russia resists, and while such traction is limited in the Middle East it has purchase more generally in the Global South. China believes Ukraine is in no way analogous to Taiwan – in political terms Taiwan is considered internal to China and in practical reality an amphibious operations against a sea fortress harder than ground forces crossing contiguous borders.  US increased security cooperation with Taiwan and its leverage of the AUKUS format will give rise to an arms race.  More broadly, China sees western predominance eroding and its promotion of “follow your own path” to development garners support in the Global South.  Volatility, rising energy and agricultural product prices, infrastructure connectivity and supply chain disruption are clear Chinese concerns. Is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the catalyst for a fundamental shift in today’s Sino-Russian axis in which the Xi–Putin relationship is central?  Xi does not want to contemplate a post-Putin Russia. China’s current narrative is that two major powers – Russia and China – seek to change the Western dominated rules-based order.  A war of attrition which weakens Russia irrevocably is not in China’s interest as it deprives China of a functioning axis that can act as strategic counter-weight to US hegemony.  China has no interest in influencing Putin, nor is it clear if it has the means to do so should the interest arise.  China will exhibit greater caution in relations with Russia, avoiding too great a dependence on the axis. However, it is not clear which other major power replace Russia.  India’s behavior is a critical factor. Session 2:      After Ukraine: Russia, China and Regional Order? We can identify three strands of thinking in Moscow concerning regional order in the context of the special operation in Ukraine – these in part represent ideas for action but also ad hoc rationalizations of possible pathways forward: Liberal Commentators – “Russia in retreat”: Russia is in the process of losing the war and as it weakens it’s FDI and technological dependence on China is strengthened.  Russia fails as a legitimate leader in post-Soviet space – it does not constitute an attractive socio-economic model. Sanctions cause a radical reshaping of Russian trade with China, but also its ability to invest in Central Asia, cutting economic growth across the region to 2.6% or less in 2022. Economic weakness and war in Ukraine diminishes Russia’s ability to be the security provider and guarantor of security in Central Asia (with spillover dangers from Afghanistan and actual instability in eastern Tajikistan) and undercuts Russian regional integrationist projects (EEU/CSTO). China becomes the dominant actor in Central Asia, Turkey in the Caucasus and the EU in the West – Russia is in retreat in post-Soviet space. Pragmatists – “Russia muddles through”: Russia avoids isolation by engaging the Global South, western disunity returns, trade with China increases in some sectors (e.g. coal x2 in 2022).  Russia still has a role to play in Central Asia: China supports the existing division of labor, with China focused on the economic and developmental sectors and Russia political-security matters. Even if Russia is a weaker player after the war, China is unlikely to want to fill the role of security provider. For example, if there is destabilization on the Afghan border, China is unlikely to want to manage a crisis alone: its preference would be for Russia to be in the lead.  Central Asia can emerge as a “grey zone” for sanctions breaking and organized crime and other illicit transactions. Ideological – “Ethno-nationalist revisionist Russia”: This strain of thought is revisionist, understanding Russia’s existential confrontation with Ukraine and the West a way of breaking the current international order and reshaping global order. Such “old political thinking” is based on balance of power, pluralism and a belief on the utility of military force. In that worldview, an alignment with China against the West is seen as vital. But this could be upset by the ideological strand of Russian ethno-nationalism that could be destabilizing (e.g. in relation to northern Kazakhstan).  Central Asian states are not ideological but pragmatic, preferring multi-vector balancing to choosing sides in a bipolar confrontation. China’s as “black box”: as access and contacts are cut, it becomes ever harder to distinguish rumor from conspiracy from opinion.  It is though clear that China’s approach to Central Asia is different from Russia’s, both in terms of means and ends. Its formation demonstrates how China views its global role. The SCO was the first of the China + X mechanism and the only regional organization China has created.  China’s structuring and ordering of this region indicates its understanding of its role in world regions and so its vison of its role in global order.  China’s primary focus has been on regional order and stable “neighborly relations”. An underlying Chinese assumption is apparent – Central Asia lacks internal agency, order is created on Chinese terms. While the West had had a linear view of how relations with China unfold, multi-dimensional spatialization is a feature of Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping. China has a connective concept of “docking” or “linking”, including Central Asian transportation hubs linking China geographically with Europe as “end destination” but also Central Asia as the “in between space” with transnational digital payments systems, satellites and other layers of Sino-centric technology. Xi’s recent emphasis on global security, highlighting particularly the safety of global supply chains, underscores this approach – it is global, maritime and continental and digital. Currently more than 1000 container ships stand-off China’s east coast ports awaiting unloading, a zero-COVID policy and the disruption caused by Russia’s invasion, indicate that in 6-8 weeks the unpredictable knock-on impact will be felt globally. Is China trapped by Russian geopolitical adventurism?  CCP leadership took two weeks to issue a statement after 24 February invasion (which was not a “lame” MFA statement but CCCP leadership).  As China reads across from Ukraine to Taiwan, an ideal outcome for China would be Russia claims victory, Ukraine remains as a neutral state, Russia controls Donbas. China reaps the strategic advantage of Russian energy at cheap prices. (Russia faces the challenge of explaining to itself Chinese control over its energy sector – investors, contractors, development). Where are China-Russia red lines? What is the conflict potential between the two?  The functional axis is interest based and once those interests no longer exist then “friendship” can fast fade.  However, short of energy and unrestricted NSR access, China does not need much else from Russia. China and Russia have different interests in the Northern Sea Route – the maritime dimension of BRI through Central Asia.  With regards to such sea lanes, China and the US adopt a similar understanding, one which Canada and Russia oppose. Russia tries to diversify links in the Indo-Pacific, supporting Vietnam and India – both strategic opponents of China. China’s attitudes to sovereignty and territorial integrity in Central Asian SCO states may be much less flexible than in Ukraine or Belarus.  Russian incursions into Kazakhstan may elicit different responses. Session 3:    RSS#6 – “China-Russia Nexus: Transatlantic Threat Assessment(s)?” Hybrid threats activities as used by Russia and China are designed to 1) undermine democracies and democratic processes, 2) impact on their decision making algorithm and 3) saturate the capacity of the target and the create cascading effects.  Such activity seeks to test and exploit vulnerabilities, can be short and long-term, are tailored to different regional contexts and very often leverage and weaponize history. In Finland and Sweden the situational awareness of the potential hybrid threats activity from China and Russia in the context of NATO accession is high. One of the reasons for this is that with NATO accession the attitude towards the accession is clear. It is always harder to determine the actual threats to specific national interests.   NATO accession and hybrid threats can be understood in terms of three phases: 1) Pre-application: given decision making in Stockholm and Helsinki was so quick and the decision to apply so sudden, hybrid threats did  not materialize in opposition to this process – Russia and China were rendered reactive; 2) Grey zone:  the period between application and actual membership provides the greatest opportunity to challenge and discredit membership. In Finland, There are multiple ways this could be done and some things have been already detected; cyber and disinformation attacks, attempts to harness those that support the Russia agenda, threats by Russia to withdraw from bilateral projects (waterway); questioning of the Aland Island status as a demilitarized zone and the status of Finnish companies in Russia (this however is connected also to a larger context of the sanctions), and threats of unspecified military consequences on accession.  Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zakharova states that “the Russian military will decide” what those consequences may be. China has reacted negatively but so far hybrid threat activity has not been visible. Previously China has used cyber tools to spy on the Finnish Parliament (trend that seem to have occurred elsewhere as well) and usage of United People’s Front especially it networks related to universities. In Sweden the situation is a bit similar; more hybrid threat activity before then this spring; disinformation campaigns have been constant and there is also an example of infiltration into the Swedish Parliament and intelligence services by Russia.  Chinese hybrid threat activities in Sweden have been vigorous. It is a larger and more active hybrid threat actor than Russia in Sweden, practicing “wolf warrior” diplomacy, threatening journalists, parliamentarians and experts and raising questions over Chinese investments in Swedish critical national infrastructure 3) Post-accession: probable normalization of hybrid threat activity akin to other NATO member states. Here Finland and Sweden will need to restart relations with Russia from scratch. As long as Russia is waging a war in Ukraine its ability to do hybrid threat activity is lower. In the case of Ukraine, early conclusions can be made that Russia’s conventional military attacks from 24 February point to the lack of success of its aim to achieve strategic goals. There is also the question of whether the hybrid threat activity slowed democratization processes but strengthened Ukrainian sense of nationhood. Both autocracies and democracies have the same practice of exerting influence over adversaries, however democracies are constrained by democratic practices like rule of law and inability of the state to compel independent media to undertake information operations or private companies to work for the state or individuals to be used to inform. The democratic states have different strategic culture to design influence operations and there is often openly declared aims. Therefore, the hybrid threat activity is what autocracies do against democratic states. Russian foreign policy from perhaps as early as 1993, certainly 1995, has sought to attain 3 goals: 1) Russian Great Power status; 2) maintain a sphere of influence in neighboring states; 3) protecting Russia from encroachments from the West.  These goals remain the same but Russia’s power has weakened and changed both relative to neighbors and the West.  In terms of Russian threat assessment of the West, 3 elements can be identified: 1) NATO enlargement: the military dimension involved the proliferation of NATO military infrastructure; the geopolitical threat was encroachment into Russia’s sphere of influence; 2) Regime change: this was first perceived as a political threat following the Rose and Orange revolutions of 2003 and 2004, but by 2014 Russian military doctrine identified color revolutions as military threats, highlighting a perception in Moscow that legitimate regimes could be changed via secret plans, external western organization and the export of destabilization/chaos designed to promote anti-Russian hostile states to limit Russian influence and ultimately weaken Russia. 3) Negation of Russia’s nuclear deterrent: western missile defense and prompt global strike are designed to eliminate Russia’s nuclear deterrent and Russia discounts US promises these systems are not targeting Russia. Role of China in Russian threat perception: Though historically the “China threat” is a feature of Russian strategic culture, this threat perception has dissipated as Russian Far East Military District ground troop deployment in Ukraine attests, though China’s economic threat potential to Russia has increased. Implicitly, while neither threatens the other, there is no expectation of direct mutual military support. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the assumption held that Russia could still, where interests aligned, cooperate with the West or even together build a new international order. This assumption is no longer valid. Russian efforts with China to weaken Western liberal international order and economic dominance are much harder. Session 4:     Ukraine, Strategic Competition and Policy Implications Roundtable? Catastrophic success? In an ideal Western end-state, Ukraine and Russia emerge as democratic and the global economy prospers.  However, might Ukraine and the West win the war but lose the peace?  Russian strategic military-political defeat in Ukraine may lead to regime implosion. If crisis is opportunity: Ukraine may emerge, in the words of President Zelensky, as “Big Israel”, a state whose identity is defined by existential threat, whose institutions are securitized and which is thriving, democratic and resilient. More generally, Russian neighbours may express their agency: Moldova advances towards EU integration; Georgia contemplates competing impulses – reintegrate South Ossetia or trade with Russia on Georgian terms; Lukashenka attempts to instrumentalise a protracted war in Ukraine to re-establish Belarus’ multi-vector credentials and so regime continuity. Russia elects to fight on two fronts: 1) a 20th C war in Ukraine that it is losing; 2) a 21st C confrontation and conflict with the ‘political West’ that it currently loses.  Ukraine and the political West are in synch – but could over time diverge. Putin’s Ukraine victory as a post-Putin regime change mechanism: Did Putin plan on winning the war to secure an exit from formal politics: winning enables Putin to leaving presidential power as “untouchable”?  If so, then a protracted conflict locks Putin further into the increasingly uncertain political realities of Russia, demanding he now, captive in the Kremlin, build an actual “power vertical” to survive. Putinism exists but are there actual Putinists?  Supporters of Putin are ruthless, opportunistic and self-interested pragmatists, loyal to the extent their interests are enabled by Putin in power. Tensions in Russia’s security services exist – Zolotov, Bortnikov, Shoigu are publicly absent. Rosgvardia members express disillusionment on vKontakte social media channels, resenting their perceived use as cannon-fodder in the “special operation”. Elite discussions acknowledge that “we are stuck”, the worrying (for Putin) step before, “unless…”.  The momentum of elite defections in 1989 and 1991 a real factor: the more fragmented the elite the greater the potential for defections. Radical nationalist Strelkov-type narratives around exterminationst actions necessary for victory are not yet expressed by Putin but this is the direction of travel. On the basis of Ukraine, the notion that what comes after Putin is much worse is unproven. Sanctions and market realities: the economic damage inflicted by sanctions on Russia remains unclear: Russian GDP is expected to fall between 5-30% of GDP; trade between sanctioning states and Russia fall between 50-70%. Economic markets are spaces not actors and within these spaces companies are the actors.  The economies of both Russia and China rely on the decentralized management of economic decision-making.  Russia does not have the institutional capacity to control Russian companies and their private interests. The global economy is one common dollar denominated space that shares values and institutions.  China is integrated into this space.  It is an either/or proposition.  If Russia is not integrated it moves further from China.   Chinese – Russian trade was in decline before the war broke out and it is now the question how much trade will bounce back in light of Russia’s declining trade with the West. As a minimum, it would make it difficult for China to cooperate with Moscow when Russia is less than ever integrated in the world economy. Sanctions float like a toxic cloud over Russia’s economy – acting as a clear incentive to disengage unless in sectors such as energy where the risk can be controlled. China will not take over the place of EU Europe in the Russian economy but will serve as partial replacement. Decentralized economies deal well with scarcity but are fragile in the face of uncertainty. China can be opportunistic and find the appropriate risk-reward equilibrium in key sectors, but can only partially replace the West. China has a clear interest in trade and export but not in including Russia in its supply chains.  Foreign (Chinese/Western) capital will not return to Russia as the trust upon which investments are bases are burnt. GCMC, 27 May 2022. Disclaimer: This summary is a synthesis by Graeme P. Herd of the presentations (Pavel Baev, Mark Galeotti, Nadine Godehardt, Dmitry Gorenburg, David Lewis, Janis Kluge, Hanna Smith and Falk Tettweiler) and extensive discussions at the SCSS Berlin Workshop on 24 May 2022 and is not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments or organization. Comment Like You can also reply to this email to leave a comment. Trouble clicking? Copy and paste this URL into your browser: https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2022/05/29/scss-berlin-workshop-24-may-2022-summary%ef%bf%bc/