Der tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland ….

Mit flammenden Lichtern
Im Stahl bricht sich der Schein
Asche und Angst tränken das Land
Seite an Seite marschieren sie nieder
Dicht an dicht
Auf Schatten folgt Licht
Und nur der Himmel weint

Hinauf in die Lüfte
Hinfort in unser Grab
Die Träume sind zerbrochen
Nur Scherben zeugen vom letzten Tanz
Sie warten und warten und warten
Dicht an dicht
Ein bleiches Gesicht
Keiner dort, der lacht

Es dunkelt fern der Heimat
Die Häupter gesenkt
Das Stampfen und Schreien
Dampf vor den Mündern
In der Luft liegt Blei
Dicht an dicht
Die Seele zerbricht
Und nur der Wind leise klagt

Ein Schrei wie aus tausend Kehlen
Die Erde bebt - ein Vorbote der Nacht
Ein blutroter Himmel neigt sich gen Westen
Dicht an dicht
Der Funken erlischt und es ward Stille
Der Richter senkt das Beil
Seine Augen so blau
Wo sich kein Stern am Himmel zeigt
Dort hinter den Zäunen
Hausen die verlorenen Seelen
Dicht an dicht so schrecklich dicht
Bis ihre Namen verblassen

Sie winden und würgen
In ihren Augen die Angst
Die Rettung scheint zu warten
Hinter den Schnäbeln der Raben
Sie beten und flehen
Dicht an dicht
Vor dem jüngsten Gericht
Doch Gott schweigt

Das Trommeln und Schlagen
Gestank erfüllt die Luft
Der kreischende Tod reitet mit dem Wind
Ein Krachen, ein Bersten
Dicht an dicht
Es schwindet die Sicht
Nur Asche bleibt zurück

An den Klippen ihrer Hoffnung gestrandet
Die Feuer erlischen
Dunkelheit senkt sich auf das Land
In ihnen ward es für immer Nacht
Dicht an dicht
Der Morgen kommt nicht
Für immer ergraut

Hinauf in die Lüfte
Hinfort in unser Grab
Wir fanden unseren Meister
Sein Auge ist Blau
Seine Zunge aus Blei
Sie trifft dich genau
Weit, so weit
Es ist an der Zeit
Für das Ende

RSS#4, 8 March 2022: “Putin Invades Ukraine: Regional Fallout?”

by Mark Galeotti

This is a summary of the discussion at the latest workshop of the current series of online Russia Seminar Series (RSS) webinars held on March 38, 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants.

Context:

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had a devastating impact on humanitarian conditions within Ukraine itself. Critical national infrastructure in Ukraine is under attack. Ukraine’s transport system, hospitals and communication networks are being degraded. The UNHCR reports that over 2 million Ukrainians, mainly women and children, have become refugees in neighboring countries, particularly Poland. At the same time, Russian military advances in Ukraine appear to have stalled in most operational theatres. Explanations for this unexpected outcome include logistical difficulties, poor planning, long and vulnerable supply lines, and an inability to execute combined arms warfare effectively. In places where Russia has taken territory, a hostile civil population protests in the rear, even in Russian-speaking regions such as Kherson. Can captured territory be held?

However, the picture is fluid and Russia is not yet fully committed. While Russia will seek to bombard the pivots and hubs used to supply military materiel through Poland and Romania, its usable precision guided weapon stockpile for this “special military operation” is fast depleting, though reserves are available for operations against NATO. Ukraine is able to create reserve battalions around Lviv and receive air defense and anti-tank capabilities. Poland has offered to hand over its entire inventory of 23 MiG-29 fighter aircraft to the US at Rammstein Air Base in Germany for potential transfer to Ukraine pending a NATO decision. These combat aircraft can be flown by Ukrainian pilots. Romania, Slovakia and Hungary also have MiG-29s in their inventories and some or all of these could also be provided to Ukraine. Russia does not have the troop to task ratio to occupy an unwilling Ukraine. And Ukrainian resistance is growing, with the calculation in Kyiv that any deal made today will not be as good as the one made a week from now.

This deadlock is dangerous as Putin needs a “special military operation” victory to support his “everything going according to plan” narrative. Thus, if “victory is not possible and defeat is not an option” – if the choice is between bloody debilitating occupation or withdrawal – then Putin may seek to escalate by opening new fronts to present the Russian public with distracting mini-breakthroughs and victories in the wider region. Short-term risks in the Black Sea region appears highest. Longer-term risks include disruptions to energy and food exports from Russia and Ukraine, and conflicts around Exclusive Economic Zones in the Black Sea, for example, as borders are redrawn but not recognized. This summary identifies short and longer term spillover risks in both regions.

Black Sea Region

Had the “special military operation” actually gone to plan, Kyiv would have fallen within 2-4 days, and in a “best case” scenario from a Russian perspective, resistance would implode and Ukraine suffer sullen occupation. At this point the risks of spillover to Moldova and Georgia would have been much higher. The ideological narrative constructed by Putin around “Slavic unity” and regathering “ancient Russian lands” may have included Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If not, then this would have suggested EU membership was off the cards for both states and imposed neutrality (“demilitarization”) would have been attempted by Russia.

However, without first capturing Odesa (still possible through a combined air assault and amphibious landing operation) and finding troops to occupy Ukraine in the context of a hostile and debilitating insurgency, military operations into Moldova do not appear viable. Transnistrian forces themselves have no offensive capability and rail links to Odesa region from Tiraspol are cut. Thus, while in Moldova pro-Russian parties and opposition groups in the breakaway Dniester region and the pro-Russian Gagauzia oppose EU accession, Russia aggression in Ukraine propels the majority of the society to support this westward economic and normative reorientation, as is the case in Georgia.

However, the seizure of Georgian territory is possible. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has been remarkably passive and inactive and still has the reserves and capacity to act. The seizure of Poti region in Georgia is a possibility, supported by Chechen forces formally subordinated to Russia’s Rosgvardia(National Guard) but actually under the control of Ramzan Kadyrov. If Putin’s power weakens, Kadyrov may also plan to act more autonomously into the Pankisi Gorge, even if in the name of Putinism and justified with reference to Russian national goals. In such circumstances, Azerbaijan might look to complete “unfinished business” towards Nagorno-Karabakh.

In Georgia itself, the Russian invasion of Ukraine further polarizes society. There is pressure on Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili and ‘Georgia Dream’ party who have adopted a “neutral” policy towards Russia. Neutrality translates into a policy of not supporting international sanctions and keeping Georgia’s air space open to Russian aircraft. Since 24 February opposition rallies in Tbilisi have protested daily against the Russian invasion outside the Georgian Parliament, demanding: 1. A visa regime with Russia; 2. Banning Russian media/propaganda outlets in Georgia; and 3. Closing Georgia’s airspace to Russia.

The role of Turkey is pivotal. Turkey attempts to avoid alienating Russia by keeping its air space open to Russian commercial flights and not applying sanctions. As a result, Turkey, like Georgia, is not included on the Russian list of hostile states. However, Turkey does send effective military aid (drones) to Ukraine. Turkey, citing Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, has closed the entrance to the Black Sea to the navies of the parties to the conflict. With its “sea bridge” unable to function, Russia is forced to resupply Syria using a more expensive and more limited air bridge. This in turn weakens Russia’s presence in Syria relative to Turkey’s. At the same time, the US and NATO face a difficult choice regarding the sending of combat ships into the Black Sea in support of Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey attempts to dissuade allies from requesting access, but the need to protect two exposed allies is growing.

Baltic Sea Region

The risk of spillovers into the Baltic-Nordic region are less than the Black Sea region, at least in the short-term and while the “active phase” of Russian aggression in Ukraine is ongoing. Risks associated with Kaliningrad proves to be the exception to this general rule. If the closure of air space is joined by cutting rail links to Kaliningrad, then this could generate a Russian kinetic response. In addition, reports of resignations and refusal of Belarusian officers and soldiers to follow orders and deploy to Ukraine suggest that Lukashenka’s regime may be less stable than supposed. Does Russia have the spare capacity to bolster Belarus, when Rosgvardia is needed at home as a praetorian safeguard to quell protest potential in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities in Russia?

The Estonian Center Party has severed ties to the United Russia Party. On 5 March, 103 members of its extended board, with no abstentions, voted to rescind the cooperation protocol signed in 2004. In Latvia, though, the polarization of society is a danger, with pro-Russian supporters using provocative rhetoric to radicalise their potential voters ahead of parliamentary elections. Two potential conflict dates loom – the commemoration of Latvian Legionnaires on 16 March and the Soviet Victory Day on 9 May. Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabrielius Landsbergis has stated that Vilnius has no red lines regarding possible sanctions against Russia – including oil and gas.

Non-aligned Finland and Sweden seek even closer defense cooperation with each other and with NATO. Indeed, the potential for NATO membership has increased and this will lead to heightened tension in medium to long-term. Defense spending is set to increase in all Baltic States. Lithuania adds an extra $0.5bn and its parliament agrees to increase defense spending to 2.5% of GDP. Spending will likely be on deterrent gaps in capabilities necessary to counter Russia’s way of war, such as air defense and drones.

Points of escalation might be driven by the possible use of thermobaric bombs in Kyiv, and/or the slaughter of Ukrainian refugee convoys struggling to reach the Polish border from Lviv. Such horrific violence would stress-test to destruction the ability of NATO member states to achieve all three of its objectives: 1) apply sanctions to Russia and provide humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine; 2) uphold national interests, democratic values and principles; and 3) avoid miscalculation, spillover and escalation. As RHSS#3 summary noted: “In the context of mass civilian casualties, how does the West calibrate and balance moral principles that reflect its values with pragmatic approaches in line with interests? At what point does “responsibility to protect” trump other considerations?” Almost certainly risk calculus in NATO would change, with a much greater emphasis on alleviating immediate suffering and the “responsibility to protect”.

Conclusions:

The invasion has also shaken the Putin regime in Russia. The Putinist system, born in the violence of the Second Chechen campaign, has grown organically over the last 23 years. It weathered the ‘Moscow Maidan’ protests of 2011-12 and was boosted by the Crimea annexation of 2014. Putin and the players in the system understood the rules of the game, how these rules could be enforced and the necessity of a balance between the normative state, parastatal entities and oligarchs. In 2022, the pressure of sanctions disrupts and destabilizes oligarchs, the business models of parastatal entities and the normative state moves to a war footing, its lead representatives complicit in the war and war crimes.

In this context, escalation does not have just to be horizontal – a spillover into the wider region – but it can be vertical. The possibility of an accidental radioactive discharge due to Russian attack on nuclear power plant is high. If nuclear signaling is needed, Russia could withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and then promptly stage a nuclear test to intimidate and deter. A low likelihood event involves a Russian “false flag” operation around CBRNE might be considered. A “dirty bomb” fits Russian media narratives that a US-controlled “neo-Nazi” regime would practice genocidal “nuclear terrorism”. The function of this narrative could be to provide a retroactive justification for invasion – prevention of nuclear terrorism – and to place the blame for any nuclear radiation leakage on Kyiv. Such leakages would massively impact on refugee flows westwards. For Putin such flows would be understood in terms of an asymmetric responses by Russia to western pressure.

Might Putin be tempted to declare martial law or a state of emergency in Russia? Putin may calculate that full mobilization is a necessary means to offset 1) battlefield losses through conscription; 2) economic isolation and rent redistributions to shore up elite support; and 3) evidence the idea that this is an existential fight for Russia, that Ukraine is merely the territory upon which Russia battles the real enemy – NATO. Such reasoning concludes that once battle is joined all measures are justified by Russia if this leads to the defeat of NATO.

If such reasoning prevails, martial law and mobilization in Russia could prove to be the second and last strategic blunder by Putin. Russian military reforms introduced by Defense Minister Serdyukov 2009-2012 means mass mobilization is not possible – the Russian military does not have the capacity or infrastructure to train such large numbers. Moreover, such a move might precipitate a societal revolt, one in which the Russian security services would struggle to maintain order. Alternatively, it could encourage a military coup, with a charismatic and politically acceptable Defense Minister Shoigu at its head. Given “everything is forever until it is no more”, the entourage and inner-circle around Putin may well calculate that the president himself is the problem and his removal the solution.

Fear of failure in Ukraine and fear of revolt and removal in Russia likely increases Putin’s isolation and paranoia. He may then adopt a differentiated understanding of risk. At home he is risk averse. Martial law or declaring a state of emergency is avoided. Putin likely compensates by accepting greater risk abroad. This suggests a Black Sea Fleet “special military operation” against Poti could come into focus, or Russia looks to conducts a dirty bomb “false flag” operation in Ukraine. In Putin’s mind, both options would create disruptive situations to generate options and new opportunities for leverage and exploitation.

GCMC, March 8, 2022.

Disclaimer: This summary reflects the views of the authors (Pavel Baev, Dmitry Gorenburg and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.

Brand ruigoord verwoestte de kabouter radiostudio …

Dat was dus de kabouterrradiostudio ????

Why sanctions against Russia exempt gas and oil

Some Ukrainians are not happy. “We need real sanctions, not just some problems for Putin’s friends,” Ukrainian lawmaker Oleksiy Goncharenco said in a video posted to Twitter Thursday. “We need an embargo on Russian gas and oil because every barrel of Russian oil and every cubic meter of Russian gas is now full of the blood of Ukrainians.“

RHSS#2, February 24, 2022: “Russia Invades Ukraine: Putin’s Mindset and End Game”

This is a summary of the discussion at the latest workshop of the current series of online Russia Hybrid Seminar Series (RHSS) webinars held on February 24, 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants.

Context:

On February 24 2022 at 0300 GMT President Putin in a nationwide address announced a “special military operation” against Ukraine. He argued that the West – an “Empire of lies” – sought to destroy Russia’s “traditional values”. Red lines had been crossed: “in the last few days the NATO leadership has been speaking about the need to accelerate the advance of the alliance’s infrastructure towards Russia’s borders”. An aggressive “anti-Russia” was being created at Russia’s borders: “For us it is a matter of life and death, the matter of our historic future as a nation [Rus: narod]. This is the very red line I have spoken about many times. And they have crossed it.” Putin stated the goals of this “special military operation”: “we will strive for the demilitarisation and denazification of Ukraine … Our plans do not include the occupation of Ukrainian territories. We are not going to impose anything on anyone by force …”. In the same breath he then warned against “interference”: “Whoever tries to interfere with us, let alone create threats for our country, for our people, should know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead you to such consequences that you have never experienced in your history.”

Russia’s Goals:

Almost immediately Russia began to invade Ukraine, from Belarus, the Black Sea, Crimea, and Russian-controlled Donbas. President Putin’s recognition of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) following the emergency session of the Russian Security Council on 21 February 2022, was to engage directly with the Ukraine military. The subsequent and further multi-axis invasion of Ukraine had, according to Putin, two main goals – ‘demilitarization’ and ‘denazification’:

‘Demilitarization’: this translates into the military defeat of the Ukrainian armed forces and militia’s in the field. To that end Russia attacked Ukrainian military infrastructure, command and control, and launched information operations and cyber-attacks seeking to degrade the Ukraine’s ability and will to fight. Going hard and fast and everywhere from the outset was designed to cause military collapse, allowing large cities to be surrounded and then surrenders/liberation to be negotiated.
‘Denazification’: this entail forced regime change through killing or capturing and imprisoning the current government under the charge that they are neo-Nazis leading a fascist junta that has undertaken genocide against Russian speakers. The question of how deep the ‘denazification’ process is supposed to run is unclear: does it include civil society activists, anti-corruption bodies, civil disobedience and become the label used to justify mass repressions?
Putin’s 5-step theory of victory: we can infer a series of logical steps in line with Putin’s stated aim of denying Ukraine statehood: 1) the process of demilitarization leaves the state unprotected; 2) regime decapitation under the guise of ‘denazification’ creates a leadership vacuum and breaks the will of society to resist; 3) Russia fills the leadership vacuum with pro-Russian stooges then are recognized by Moscow, the Ukrainian constitution is changed, and state stabilized; 4) the new leadership sign a “Minsk 3” agreement recognizing Crimea as part of Russia and the two Donbass territories as independent states and conclude as security pact with Russia; 5) Over the longer term full-scale costly and reputation-sapping military occupation is not necessary to exert sufficient control over a ‘Russian Ukraine’. Russia exercises power at much lower cost through elite proxies, soft power tools (media control) and the cooption of some regional elites and representatives. As we noted in RHSS#1 summary: “Putin seeks to extinguish Ukraine as a politically pluralist democratic polity with a vibrant civil society on Russia’s doorstep, removing a legitimation challenge to a dictatorial and quasi-monarchial Russia.” In the process Russia destroys the notion of Ukraine as an independent entity, the very idea of Ukrainian statehood.
Putin’s 1956/1968 Instrumental Beliefs: There are two Soviet intervention models that provide loose comparisons and analogies for understanding Putin’s strategic behavior. First, in late 2020 Putin threatened the Belarusian opposition that Russia would intervene with a “law enforcement reserve force”. This was akin to Soviet military mobilization on the border with Poland in 1981. Second, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 compares to Soviet interventions into Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, with Prague and Budapest substituting then for Kyiv today. Invasion or ‘intervention’ was then and is now justified by the restoration of ‘order’.
Putin’s 1941-45 Philosophical Beliefs: While Russia conducts a “war of aggression against a sovereign state”, in the words of Germany’s foreign minister, and a democratic Ukraine fights for survival against a dictatorial Russia, Putin is caught in his own time warp. He appears to be fighting the Great Patriotic War in miniature. In his ‘special military operation’ speech of 0300 GMT 24 February, Putin notes that in 1941 the USSR made a mistake in “pleasing a potential aggressor. We won’t make such a mistake for the second time, we do not have the right to.” Putin understands Russia to be refighting “neo-Nazis”, a “fascist junta” in Kyiv, one that practices genocide, and is in need of denazification. Putin wages war in the present to purge the past and rid Russia of grievances, resentments, and humiliations. Thus while post-war Soviet intervention practice may provide models that shape ‘Putin’s the tactician’s’ instrumental beliefs, the Great Patriotic War very much shapes ‘Putin the ideologue’s’ picture of the world, the philosophical beliefs in his operational code.

Putin’s Risk Calculus and Reality Check/Miscalculation?

Putin’s Inner Circle and Decision–Making: There is evidence to suggest that as of late spring 2021 a decision had been made to invade, with planning far advanced by October 2021, but this was not preordained and precise timing and choreography had yet to be settled. The televised Russian Security Council meeting of 22 February was an attempt to broaden the circle of responsibility by publicly associating all Security Council members with the decision to recognize the rebel DNR and LNR as independent states. In reality, the Security Council is not a decision-making forum. It may offer assessments and advice. Putin’s inner decision-making circle shrinks to three or four individuals: Alexander Bortnikov (Head of FSB), Sergei Patrushev (Secretary of Security Council), Sergei Naryshkin (Head of SVR) and Sergei Shoigu (Defense Minister). The first three, at least, appear more hard-line than Putin himself regarding opposition to the West and a desire to reassert Russian great power status, prestige and honor. They have most to lose from Putin stepping down in 2024 and are most invested in ‘victory’ over Ukraine. Putin clearly conflates “Russia’s destiny” with his continued rule.
Russian Public Support/Opinion: There was no real attempt to mobilize public support in Russia prior to the invasion. This suggests that either passive or apathetic support is sufficient. It may reflect Putin’s thinking public support for something is not important, it only becomes so when it is against him. The justification for invasion – that the Ukrainian leadership are Nazi’s – is one that superficially will have broadest appeal in Russia, but on closer appeal creates cognitive dissonance: President Volodymyr Zelensky is Jewish as well as Russian-speaking and where is the evidence of genocide committed against the Russian speakers in Ukraine? Public protests in Russia are sporadic and small-scale but nevertheless are occurring. Russian state controlled media fully support the “special operation to protect the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics”, but near-silence on actions along other vectors of attack from Belarus or operations near Kharkiv will be hard to sustain. How is carnage in Kyiv to be explained?
Insurgency”: The ability of the less well-equipped Ukrainian military to retard Russian advances under Russian air superiority points to morale and motivation differences as an important factor in warfare. The longer the conventional military conflict, the more radicalized the Ukrainian population and more determined to undertake passive resistance, civil disobedience and insurgency, the less legitimate pro-Russian elements in Ukraine will be. If Russia should try and adopt ‘Syria tactics’ in quelling resistance in the cities of a brother nation – attack schools, hospitals and bakeries to create refugees – it will suffer a massive reputational loss. The first casualties will be Ukrainian civilians, the second Russian narratives associated with ‘liberation from a junta’ and ‘Slavic brotherhood’. Liberators do not fight their way into “the mother of all Russian cities”.
Western unity: Sanctions are designed to impose costs, to deter further escalation in the short-term and curtail Russia’s ability to do more harm in the longer-term, as well as to demonstrate unity, and provide Ukraine with time. Current sanctions appear designed to impose systemic costs to the Russian economy and curtail the consumption habits and mobility of Russia’s elite. The triggering of SWIFT cut-off and personal sanctions on Putin are held back for now as an escalatory reserve and conditional on how Kyiv is taken.
Belarus: President Alyaksandr Lukashenka loses in most scenarios bar one: prolonged Ukrainian resistance and need for mediation. In other respects he is even more dependent on Putin. Arguments advanced by Putin regarding Ukraine’s lack of statehood and “ancient Russian lands” can also be made to work against an independent Belarus. The limits of Lukashenka’s autonomy is likely to be the extent to which he can keep the Belarusian military on Belarus soil. Lukashenka has stated: “our troops do not take any part in this operation.”

Stop Putin (Click for full image!)

Abolition Mixtape with Chris “Time” Steel (click to view, then click to play content from the final straw radio anarchist podcast)

Putin is a crazy war criminal! (click to view)

Lutkemeer

Stuur een bericht

In de stemwijzer van de gemeente Amsterdam is een vraag over de Lutkemeerpolder verwerkt. Hier vind je ook de verschillende opvattingen over dit onderwerp van vrijwel alle politieke partijen.

We roepen iedereen op om verschillende partijen aan te schrijven. Allereerst om je mening te geven, maar vooral ook om hen op te roepen onmiddellijk alle werkzaamheden te staken.

Download hier een lijst met mailadressen. GroenLinks, D66, PvdA en Volt liggen voorlopig aan kop in de peilingen, gevolgd door VVD en Partij voor de Dieren.

Verderop in de nieuwsbrief is meer te lezen over de standpunten, de feiten en onze argumenten

Webinar grondpolitiek

Alles wat je altijd al had willen weten over de Lutkemeerpolder!

Het verhaal van de Lutkemeerpolder is een verhaal over vastgoed. Grond tussen Amsterdam en Schiphol is veel waard. De druk op dit soort gronden voor meer ‘rendabelere’ exploitatie dan landbouw is dan ook enorm. Er kunnen miljoenen verdiend worden. Op tijd grond kopen en verkopen kan zeer lucratief zijn. En dat trekt ook malafide ontwikkelaars aan. In de Lutkemeerpolder is het niet anders.

Daar komt bij dat we in de Lutkemeer te maken hebben met de gemeente Amsterdam in verschillende rollen: als grondeigenaar, aandeelhouder en vergunningverlener.

Ingewikkelde constructies die leiden tot veel vragen. Wie is nu de eigenaar van de grond? En hoe zit het nu met die corruptie? Deze en alle andere vragen rond dit onderwerp willen we beantwoorden tijdens het webinar van maandag 28 februari om 20.00.

Volg het online via deze link. Ook vragen stellen en meepraten? Stuur dan een mail naar info@voedselparkamsterdam.nl voor de link met het wachtwoord.

Integriteitsschending

Al twee jaar lang wijst Behoud Lutkemeer de gemeenteraad op de corruptie die heeft plaats gevonden bij het tot stand komen van het bestemmingsplan Lutkemeer.
Vorige week gaf de rechtbank ons weer gelijk, weer een stap in een eindeloze juridische procedure.Omdat inhoudelijke behandeling nog steeds uitblijft en het proces zo traag verloopt, is er een melding gedaan aan het Bureau Integriteit. Een afschrift is aan de ombudsman gestuurd. Lees hier het persbericht.

direct doneren

We zitten nu over een kwart miljoen met ruim 2700 donateurs. Dat moeten er nog veel meer worden. Help mee en deel deze link!

Sla ook alarm!

Nog steeds wordt er gewerkt aan de verdere vernieling van de polder. Deze week zijn er rijplaten neergelegd, dat beloofd weinig goeds…schrijf de politiek aan!

Volg hier de webinar

De webinar is online te volgen. Meedoen en vragen stellen? Mail dan aan info@voedselparkamsterdam.nl voor link en wachtwoord

Terugkijken?

De laatste webinars zijn terug te zien op youtube.

Politieke standpunten, feiten en argumenten

Hieronder een aantal vaak terugkerende uitspraken waarom de Lutkemeerpolder niet behouden kan blijven en onze reactie daarop. Inspraak is ook terug te zien.

De grond is niet van de gemeente. Klopt, hij is van de GEM Lutkemeer Beheer BV, waar de gemeente Amsterdam voor 50% eigenaar van is. De andere 50% is van SADC BV. Deze BV is voor 25% van de gemeente Amsterdam, samen met provincie Noord Holland, gemeente Haarlemmermeer en Schiphol BV (en om het nog ingewikkelder te maken: Schiphol is grotendeels van de Staat der Nederlanden en… gemeente Amsterdam).

Belangrijker is wie heeft uiteindelijk zeggenschap over de grond, dat is de gemeente Amsterdam! Zij gaan het na ontwikkeling uitgeven in erfpacht, waaruit dus blijkt dat het onderbrengen in de GEM BV geen verkoop is, maar een juridische constructie.

Het is dan ook niet onherroepelijk verkocht zoals soms wordt gezegd, maar ondergebracht in een BV om vervolgens als aandeel in te brengen in SADC BV die in die periode aan de rand van een faillissement stond. De rest is geschiedenis.

Het niet tot ontwikkeling brengen van de Lutkemeerpolder zou tientallen miljoenen kosten. Het is goed om dit nader te bekijken. Allereerst omdat kosten en waarde door elkaar heen worden gebruikt. Als de grond minder waard wordt, dan kost dat niets. Het levert potentieel minder op. Potentieel: want het is maar de vraag of alle kavels wel zo goed worden verkocht als wordt beweerd. Voorlopig is er geen grote afnemer bekend en heeft het bij het naastgelegen terrein twintig jaar geduurd tot alles vol was.

Er zal sprake zijn van planschade en mogelijk komen er claims. Of dat tientallen miljoenen zijn, is maar zeer de vraag en daarbij, wie claimt dan wie? Provincie Noord Holland jegens de gemeente? Of gaat de overheids-BV Schiphol beslag leggen? Het blijven overheden die geld heen en weer schuiven met – wat te vaak vergeten wordt- gemeenschapsgeld.

Daartegenover staan de kosten van dit ontwikkelplan: de deelneming van de gemeente Amsterdam in SADC heeft al ettelijke miljoenen gemeenschapsgeld gekost. En: nog belangrijker, het bouwrijp maken van de polder kost ook ca 1 miljoen per hectare. Dat spaar je direct uit!

Als een meerderheid vindt dat een besluit verouderd is, is dat een heel goede reden dit te herzien. Dat maakt je niet een onbetrouwbare overheid. Sterker nog, je bent een betrouwbare overheid jegens de burger en gericht op de toekomst. In plaats van trouw aan verkeerde inschattingen uit het verleden.

De gemeente kan nog altijd terug door het bestemmingsplan te wijzigen. Daarmee wordt alle ontwikkeling stopgezet. Ongeacht welke constructie eigenaar is en ongeacht wat daarvan de consequenties zijn. Dat vergt tijd en politieke moed.

Tegelijkertijd is het van groot belang om verdere destructie van de polder te voorkomen. Daarom is stap één: een onmiddellijk moratorium op alle werkzaamheden en aan tafel met de stakeholders om alle mogelijkheden en wegen goed te onderzoeken. De steun van de stad, de bewoners en vooral in Nieuw West is er.

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Belangrijker dan ooit

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Solidarity with Ukraine

First post India published this article on the ongoing European problem

The meta-narrative about India’s non-involvement in the Ukraine imbroglio

As Brahma Chellaney keeps saying, Western Europeans and Americans are fighting the wrong enemy. This creeping NATO-isation is a distraction when they should be worrying about China

Rajeev SrinivasanFebruary 24, 2022 09:51:09 IST

A woman wears Ukrainian national colours at a demonstration along the street near the Russian embassy to protest against the escalation of the tension between Russia and Ukraine in Berlin, Germany. AP

The ongoing shadow-boxing between US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin over Ukraine has captured a lot of media attention. I was going to say “world attention”, but not really. It is a European problem, and those in the Indo-Pacific really don’t care much about it. Old-guard Atlanticists are bellyaching as though it were the end of the world, but it isn’t. And that is the first thing to note: Euro-centrism has had its day, and Europe matters less every day.

All of the dramatis personae have not-so-hidden agendas that they bring to the party. In the end, as far as the impartial observer is concerned, this is not likely to lead to World War III despite all the blood-curdling rhetoric; the problem for disinterested parties is that oil prices are zooming in anticipation of war, or biting sanctions. Oil at $100 is good for Putin, and probably for Biden’s shale warriors, but developing nations will be hurt.

Said developing countries are uninterested in the finer points of European nationalism, and would prefer that everybody make nice and go home. They really would prefer no war. This European hissy-fit is not their problem.

There is a Malayalam proverb that goes: “Whether the thorn lands on the leaf, or the leaf lands on the thorn, it is the leaf that is hurt”. That is the exact situation developing countries, already devastated by the Covid pandemic, face. They don’t really care about the wounded pride of Putin or Biden or whoever, but would rather oil prices were back in the $50-$60 range, so they don’t face another extortionate transfer of wealth.

Of course the sentiments of Ukrainians have to be considered. My first exposure to this was in the late 1970s when I was a graduate student in computer science, and my study group partner was a Ukrainian-American. I casually referred to her as Russian, because at that time the Soviet Union was still going strong, and Ukraine was a part of it. She flared up, and gave me an earful about how Ukrainians were not Russians, but oppressed by Russians.

Clearly, there is a lot of bad blood between the old subjects of the Soviet Empire and the colonial masters, the Russians. In fact Indians can quite relate to this, because our colonial masters, the British, were absolute monsters, too. So yes, I am sympathetic to the struggles of Ukrainians to assert their cultural and territorial independence.

But then, I am sympathetic to the Chagos Islanders, who were evicted by the colonial Brits, so that America’s Diego Garcia naval base could be built. Courts have ruled that the islands belong to Mauritius, not Britain, but none of those bleating about Ukraine’s ‘territorial integrity’ seem to be in a hurry to eject Brits from the Chagos islands. Ah, so that’s different.

Obviously morality is not the issue here. I was listening to a talk by John Mearsheimer, a respected geo-strategist, and he said candidly that the problem was the fault of the Americans. Just as much as the Monroe Doctrine creates a sphere of influence for the US in its backyard, it is only reasonable that in the post-Soviet era, the succeeding power Russia would like to maintain a sphere of influence in its backyard.

At least, they would not want NATO to nibble at their periphery and expand itself, thus causing the Russians to feel vulnerable militarily. But the Democratic party appears to be chock-full of Atlanticists – possibly because their leaders are mostly from their East Coast, including Biden — and apparently they and the US Deep State are fighting the Cold War all over again. This is ridiculous because (checks notes) they won that war. But then generals are always fighting the last war again, because, well, that’s what generals do.

This is also counter-productive because they are simply driving the Russians into the dhritarashtra alinganam of the Chinese. A Eurasian heartland that is controlled by a Sino-Russian alliance is not in the interests of the Americans or their allies in Europe. In fact, a Huntingtonian view would suggest that Western Europeans and Americans should ally themselves with the Russians to form a united white Christian alliance against the Chinese.

As Brahma Chellaney keeps saying, Western Europeans and Americans are fighting the wrong enemy. This creeping NATO-isation is a distraction when they should be worrying about China.

For some reason this does not seem to occur to them, and there are many possible reasons: Democrats are still fighting Donald Trump, and they think the Russiagate angle is a winning tactic against the resurgent Republicans; there was a lot hanky-panky done in Ukraine by Hunter Biden, Joe Biden’s son (you might remember his laptop, whose motley contents were a story buried by the complicit media); and there are untouchable US assets and interests in China (especially those of Wall Street), so China can do no wrong.

***

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Countering Chinese and Russian Narratives

GPCSS#6, February 15, 2022: Countering Chinese and Russian Narratives

by Mark Galeotti

This is a summary of the discussion at the latest workshop of the current series of online Great Power Competition Seminar Series (GPCSS) webinars held on February 15, 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants.

Introduction:

“Narrative” is a neutral term. A political and strategic narrative is “a means by which political actors attempt to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors”.[1] A narrative consist of a sequence of causally related events and their structural features include characters/actors, scene/setting, obstacle/puzzle to overcome, tools to achieve this end and desired or feared end-states. Three types of interwoven narratives can be identified:

Identity narratives are narratives about an actor, the factors that constrain and define their actions, character and ideas, how the actors will behave in the future and who is considered friend, enemy, small power, great power, etc.
Policy narratives advance normative or interest-based agendas.
System narratives focus on the economic or political systems actors inhabit, such as liberal world order, bi-polar order, polycentric order, etc.

Narratives evoke emotions, shared identity, and are tailored to specific audiences. Successful narratives are supported by coherent actions, strategic communication, and control of the narrative, multipliers, and interpretive predominance. Narrative can both foster cooperation or confrontation depending on the willingness of the actors to align in constructing shared meaning or not. An example of the former would be: “climate change as challenge for mankind that can only be overcome collectively”.

Russia’s Global Order Narrative:

“Russia’s” world view and strategic outlook places itself in relation to other states in a new global order. This has implications for resilient democratic counter narratives. In a narrow sense, “narrative” refers to what the Kremlin says, but says nothing about what the people in the Kremlin think. A sharp distinction needs to be drawn between genuine cognitive and instrumental perceptions, that is, between what decision-makers really think (deeds as “revealed preference”), and what they claim, what they profess to think, so as to influence domestic and foreign audiences (which can constitute “rhetorical camouflage”).

A second clarification concerns the question as to what it is that is meant when we say: “Russia thinks”, or when we try to fathom “Russia’s strategic interests”. Essentially, we are talking about what “Putin” thinks. This is increasingly analytically correct, indeed, thesystem he has built has aptly been called the “Putin System.” It is autocratic, authoritarian and increasingly centralized, that is, it is based on the “vertical of power” (vertikal’ vlasti). Decisions of any significance in domestic or foreign policy cannot be made without participation and consent of the Kremlin’s chief. That applies even more so to the formulation of basic foreign policy directions.

If we want to broaden the notion of “Putin”, when we are talking about the “Russia’s world view” and “Russia’s strategic interests”, we are essentially talking about those of the Russian power elite that at present is dominated by the siloviki. Just as the new political thinking of the Gorbachev era was shaped by the institutchiki, the return to traditional Great Power and Geopolitical Concepts in the Putin era is shaped by the siloviki. Putin and the Moscow power elite have restored many of of the elements of the Soviet leadership’s ideas about international affairs. These include the notions that:

Power, prestige, status, and influence of any given country in world affairs depend on the size of its population, geographical expanse, endowment with natural resources, volume of industrial and agricultural output, and access to or control over human and material resources abroad.
The most important factor determining the influence of a country in international affairs, the main driver of many things, is military power. Military power is not only an instrument of deterrence but also of “compellence”, that is, weaker countries can be forced to comply with Russian demands.
The greater the discrepancy between one’s own military capabilities and that of the opponent(s), the more effective the threat. As Sergei Karaganov notes: “Starting from the middle of the 2000s, Russia began strengthening its military-political potential, inexpensively but very effectively … [It[ rebuilt its military machine, a first-class resource in a world of growing chaos and fierce competition.” “With the latest generation of weapons, we have shown that we can lead wherever necessary, and at small cost.” Russian “[military power] cut the ground from under the foundation of the centuries-old dominance held by Europe and the West.” “[And] by [having] rebalanced economic ties towards the East [notably towards China] and reduced [our] overwhelming economic dependence on the West [we have gained] more room for manoeuvre.”[2]
Russia is not just a European power but is also a power in Asia. As a Eurasian power and should be the “leading forcer” in this geopolitical space. Eurasia, the Kremlin asserts, is Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence, an area of legitimate “special” or “privileged” interests. To quote Putin at the annual gathering of Russian ambassadors in 2004: “If Russia were to abstain from an active policy [in that space] or even embark on an unwarranted pause in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], this would inevitably lead to other, more active, states resolutely filling this geopolitical space.”
Ukraine is of special importance, as Putin made clear in his July 11, 2021 article On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians. He claims that the current Ukrainian government pursues a policy of “forced assimilation” of ethnic Russians and is bent on establishing an ethnically pure Ukrainian state that is aggressive towards Russia, comparing the consequences of this approach to “the use of weapons of mass destruction” against Russia. “The West is complicit in this endeavour. It intends to transform Ukraine into a barrier between Russia and Europe, into an anti-Russian “springboard”. “It cultivates the image of an internal and external enemy and pursues the militarisation of Ukraine (including the expansion of NATO’s infrastructure on its territory).” “Moscow will never allow its “historical territories” and the people living there to be used against Russia. Those who undertake such an attempt will destroy their own country.”
A further driver and important part of the Russian narrative is that the West is fundamentally and irreconcilably ill disposed towards Russia. Its aim is to “contain” Russia, maximally to weaken and constrain it; to limit its global and regional influence; and even, if it saw corresponding opportunities, to dismember it. Following the Beslan terrorist attack in September 2004, Putin on national TV stated: “Generally speaking, one has to admit that we failed to understand the complexities and dangers of processes under way in the world. At any rate, we failed to respond appropriately to them. We showed weakness. And the weak get beaten.” Evidently specifically in relation to the North Caucasus, he said that“Some would like to tear off a ‘juicy piece’ from us. Others help them. They help, because they believe that Russia as one of the major nuclear powers is still a threat to them. A threat that should be removed. And terrorism is, of course, a mere instrument to achieve such aims”.
Finally, objectively systemic competition exists between democracy and authoritarianism in the word order. The Kremlin holds in this respect that the Western governments’ clamor for the universal dissemination of human and civil rights, pluralism, democracy and the “free flow of information” with the help of so-called “non-governmental organizations” is part and parcel of hybrid warfare against Russia and designed to subvert its global and regional influence. One of the major techniques used by them are so-called “color revolutions,” that is, the overthrow of legitimate governments.

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Narrative:

The CCP has long history in constructing its (and a Chinese) narrative. The CCP’s narrative depicts a cooperative approach to adapting/transforming the world order; the West could use this narrative to reduce tensions. The CCP exercises control over its narrative using open and covert means.

The CCP’s leadership has strongly controlled its narrative for decades. Even before gaining total control over mainland China, Mao was convincingly promoting his narrative of the peoples struggle for liberation, the present and future to Western journalists and Soviet officials.
The active work on CCP´s and China’s history was institutionalized with the first so-called “Resolution on History” by Mao in 1945 (7^th plenary session of the 6^th Central Committee), followed by Deng[3] in 1981 (6^th plenary session of 11^th Central Committee) and most recently by Xi in November 2021 (6^th plenary session of 19^th Central Committee). The CCP uses this narrative to demonstrate and cement its legitimacy to rule. As such, the narrative is preface to the Chinese Constitution and every report to the CCP Congresses.
Every resolution represents a new era in Chinese history (standing up, getting rich, and getting strong). The three iconic figures Mao, Deng, and Xi have “liberated” political space for the future development of China by establishing rule/dictatorship of the Chinese people (i.e. communist revolution), opening China and hence enabling economic growth, eradicating societal differences in wealth and opportunity and leading China on its path to its natural status as a Great Power.
The role of the CCP is emphasized in this narrative, its central mission to bring happiness to the Chinese people and rejuvenation to the Chinese nation. In November 2012 with the “China or Chinese Dream” Xi’s narrative has widened its focus from the Chinese people to the world (“Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era”, October 2017). This identity narrative is complemented by stronger policy and system narratives. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is now described in an international setting in which modernization (Westernization) is an aberration leading to severe challenges to the whole mankind. Chinese wisdom can help to solve global problems.
One strand in this CCP narrative currently is that the CCP has confidence in its path, its theoretical salience, Chinese institutions and Chinese culture. It encourages all developing nations to initiate their own paths to modernization (contrasting this to Western endeavors, and comparing it with new international communist movement). China’s system “offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers China’s wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind”.
An example of Chinese wisdom is the “All under Heaven-theory” (Tianxia), rooted in China’s history (Zhou-Dynasty, ca 1100 -256 B.C.), when a small state governed a number of large states. The aim is not to return to the historic (tribute) system but to use the experience to create a new world order/governance in which mankind can prosper. China contrasts two different concepts – Roman imperialism and Chinese Tianxia. Both have “worldness” perspectives. Imperialism wants to create a universal world by domination (maximize self-interest), while Tianxia seeks to create a sharable world (co-existence and compatibility, co-existence as prerequisite for existence, maximize shared interest).
Tianxia comprises three elements: a) a geographical real or physical world, b) socio-psychological world (network of relations), and c) legitimate world system/institution. Currently, according to the CCP, while the geographical world is real, there are no shared interests or legitimate world institutions (“non-world”); the world is in stage of anarchy and mankind is in danger of losing the world.
To realize Tianxia and achieve shared world interests and cooperation, four concepts need to be put in place: 1) internalization of the world (non-exclusiveness, overcome the division between friends and enemies); 2) relational rationality (overcome individual rationality which seeks to maximize self-interests, in order to minimize mutual hostility); 3) Confucian Improvement (system is legitimate if it improves situation of every actor); and, 4) compatible universalism.[4]
The BRI, new type of Great Power relations are posited as counter-narrative to the “Thucydides Trap” (hot war) or “Churchill Trap” (cold war), and as a means of criticizing the US for forging a bipolar narrative (Strategic Competition). Currently we find ourselves in a war of narratives which has the potential to lead to a new “Cold War”. China blames the US for waging a “public opinion war on China”. It claims that the West has an ideological bias against China.
China actively spreads its narrative and shapes the discourse by using different means. It totally controls domestic discourse through censorship and pressure on journalists. It actively influences the Chinese diaspora and key-persons in academia, economy, and politics abroad and influences foreign media outlets.
This results in a multifaceted, adaptive, and complex set of tactics that are deployed across varied environments. They combine widely accepted forms of public diplomacy with more covert, corrupt, and coercive activities that undermine democratic norms, reduce national sovereignty, weaken the financial sustainability of independent media, and violate the laws of some countries.[5]
Trends since 2017:
- Russian-style social media disinformation campaigns and efforts to manipulate search results on global online platforms have been attributed to China-based perpetrators.
- Tactics that were once used primarily to co-opt Chinese diaspora media and suppress critical coverage in overseas Chinese-language publications are now being applied—with some effect—to local mainstream media in various countries.
- Beijing is gaining influence over crucial parts of some countries’ information infrastructure, as Chinese technology firms with close ties to the CCP build or acquire content-dissemination platforms used by tens of millions of foreign news consumers.
- There is evidence that Chinese-owned social media platforms and digital television providers in multiple regions have engaged in politicized content manipulation to favor pro-Beijing narratives.
- Chinese officials are making a more explicit effort to present China as a model for other countries, and they are taking concrete steps to encourage emulation through trainings for foreign personnel and technology transfers to foreign state-owned media outlets.
Additionally active Information Operations from the Chinese side are initiated both by persons and bots. One notable example is the 20 Million strong Communist Youth League spreading CCP propaganda on social media. China realizes that it will not persuade the US and other Western countries so the “prize” in strategic competition are developing countries that seek their own development path (see above). China is quite successful in this competition: the Afobarometer 2019/20 “Best model for development” placed the USA at 32%, China at 23% and countries rated their own model at 7%. China was rated 63% as a positive external influence, with the US at 60%.

Conclusions: China and Russia’s Respective Roles in the New Order?

Ideologies consist of clusters of ideas that link problems, to blame and point to solutions. Both Russia and China advance identity, policy and systems narratives. In terms of apportioning “blame”, Russia and China are aligned – the US and its allies are to blame. However, both China and Russia identify different problems and posit different solutions. Thus, there are points of convergence as well as competition between Russian and Chinese narratives.

China works with the current international order where it appears to serve its interests, and circumvents it where it believes that it does not. Despite the means China uses to propagate its narrative, the narrative itself is cooperative in its nature. Russia’s narrative stresses the need for confrontation with the “totalitarian West”. Russia actively strives to destroy the Western, rule-based system. It now rejects the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe as an essentially anti-Russian project. Currently China views the uneven distribution of wealth within China as the primary contradiction to be overcome (in accordance with the logic of dialectical materialism), Russia views the uneven distribution of power in the international system as the core problem, and either a new Cold War or Global Concert of Great Powers as the solution. In contrast to the Soviet era, however, Russia does not have a missionary purpose and it does not advance a counter or alternative system. Unlike China, Russia lacks its own compelling vision of the future, a developmental or modernization paradigm.

Russia stresses friendship and cooperation with China, but a Russian critique of the Chinese system of governance appears taboo. China, though, views the collapse of the Soviet Union that saw the emergence of the Russia Federation as an object lesson in what not to do. Understanding the linkages between Russian and Chinese narratives helps develop resilient democratic counter narratives. It also can identify potential fracture points between Chinese and Russian narratives – whether that be over a Ukraine invasion by Russia or Taiwan by China, competing interests in the Arctic or contestation of the Eurasian shared neighbourhood.

GCMC, February 16, 2022.

Disclaimer: This summary reflects the views of the authors (Hannes Adomeit, Falk Tettweiler and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.

[1] Miskimmon, A, O’Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L., Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order, (London: Routledge, 2013), 2.

[2] Sergei Karaganov, “On a Third Cold War”, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 3, July/September 2021: https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/on-a-third-cold-war/ (accessed 16 February 2022).

[3] Deng’s 4 cardinal principles (March 1979): The principle of upholding the socialist path; The principle of upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship; The principle of upholding the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); The principle of upholding Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism–Leninism.

[4] That is, to bind universalism to relations not to individuals and accept the diversity of cultures; the basic principle being: “any value that can be defined by symmetrical relations can prove to be universal and inevitable, and can gain general consent. Any value that cannot be defined by symmetrical relations only represents personal preferences or specific values of a particular group”. Zhao, T. Redefining a Philosophy for World Governance (Singapore: Palgrave, 2019), 60. In other words, a mono-theological ideology that believes its values are universal and that others should adopt as the only value system generates conflict among civilizations.