Nieuwsbrief 32 www.behoudlutkemeer.nl | info@behoudlutkemeer.nl Bekijk de webversie Behoud Lutkemeer zet zich in om de Lutkemeerpolder te behouden voor de stad Amsterdam. Ook steunen?  Deel deze nieuwsbrief en houd onze website en facebookpagina in de gaten voor activiteiten, demonstraties en oproepen. English summary below vrijdag 25 juni 13.00 volgende actie bij AH-hoofdkantoor. Kom ook! Eind mei hebben we gevraagd om een gesprek met de directie met AH en om een reactie op het voornemen om in de Lutkemeerpolder te gaan bouwen. Albert Heijn, trek je terug is ons devies. Naar aanleiding van hun reactie zien wij ons genoodzaakt door te gaan met acties. De eerstvolgende actie is bij het hoofdkantoor in Zaandam op vrijdag 25 juni om 13.00. (Provincialeweg 11). Een leuke fietstocht, of gezamenlijk vanaf station Zaandam, verzamelen om 12.45. We zullen de directie uitnodigen om de polder met eigen ogen te zien en laten tijdens het protest vogelgeluiden horen, van vogels die dreigen te verdwijnen. AH legt de verantwoordelijkheid bij de gemeente als ontwikkelaar, maar zonder koper, geen verkoper. Het is een zelftstandige keuze van AH om in de Lutkemeerpolder te bouwen. Heel recent opende AH nog een enorm distributiecentrum in Westpoort aan de  Beiraweg 3, slechts 7 km verderop. En dat ze zeggen in de verkennende fase zitten is ook bijzonder. Uit de documentatie blijkt dat ze al sinds begin 2019 in gesprek zijn met de gemeente. We hebben Ahold Delhaize een open brief gestuurd en zullen volgende week vrijdag opnieuw inzetten op een gesprek. Recent opende AH nog een enorm distributiecentrum in Westpoort aan de  Beiraweg, 7 km verderop. English summary Follow up action Ahold A battle over the Lutkemeerpolder, in the west of Amsterdam, has been raging for years now. The municipality wants to build an distribution centers. Neighbours and thousands of sympathisers want to keep the polder, its biological agriculture and nature. The interested company has been revealed: Ahold, the holding behind Albert Heijn, Etos, Gall&Gall, and Bol.com; Ahold merged in 2016 with Delhaize which also owns supermarkets in VS and elsewhere. This specific distribution center is very probably meant for Albert Heijn. In a reaction on our last action AHOLD announced they are ‘scouting the spot’ and point the city council as responsible. Without buyer, no seller, so AH has is own responsibility.  A follow-up action has been announced for next week Friday June 25th 1 pm, at the headquarters of Ahold in Zaandam. (Provincialeweg 11) “We will continue until Ahold got the message; AH has to go away”.   Tuinierders gezocht! Er wordt hard getuinierd in de polder, maar we kunnen nog veel hulp gebruiken. Misschien wil je zelf een stukje tuin beheren of helpen met het wieden en watergeven in de gemeenschappelijke stukken. Het bouwen van voorzieningen is ook zeer welkom. Meld je via info@behoudlutkemeer.nl als je ook mee wilt doen. We hebben je hulp nodig! Wat kun je nog meer doen? – Schrijf een berichtje op de publieke facebook Albert Heijn en stuur een bericht – Bel met het hoofdkantoor: 088 6599111 of de klantenservice: 0800 0305 – Tag @AlbertHeijn op twitter (#ahmustgo #behoudlutkemeer) – Chat met Albert Heijn op whatsapp – Geef in je lokale Albert Heijn deze brief af aan de manager. – Zoek op linkedin Ahold of Albert Heijn. Ken je iemand die daar werkt? Stuur een bericht. – haal bovenstaande flyers op één van de afhaalpunten en deel deze uit bij Albert Heijn – houd actie-aankondigingen in de gaten via onze website en social media. Verzoek herziening bestemmingsplan Commissievergaderingen gemeente Na een maandenlange procedure is Stichting Behoud Lutkemeer eindelijk in het gelijk gesteld: ze zijn belanghebbend en de gemeenteraad moet beslissen over het verzoek Herziening bestemmingsplan. Op 30 juni is het geagendeerd  bij de commissievergadering Ruimtelijke Ordening. Eerder deze maand besprak de gemeenteraad op verzoek van Partij van de Dieren de reserveringsovereenkomst en een mogelijke komst van Albert Heijn naar de polder. Kijk hier de behandeling terug. (Inspraak is op 14.20 en 18.15) Een transcriptie van de behandeling (incl commentaar) is hier terug te lezen. Doneer voor de Lutkemeer De campagne en de juridische procedures kosten geld. Ook een steentje bijdragen? Doneer voor de Lutkemeer! NL94 INGB 0007 2294 84 tnv Het Luchtkasteel ovv Behoud Lutkemeer Geef je op voor alarmlijst Als er gedreigd wordt met zandwagens en acute actie nodig is: geef je op voor de alarmlijst. mail je telefoonummer naar info@behoudlutkemeer.nl en tot slot een oproep om ook te tekenen: Niet alleen de Lutkemeer, ook de Sloterplas wordt bedreigd door de plannen van de gemeente. Lees hier meer erover! Veel gestelde vragen over het verzet in de Lutkemeerpolder Facebook Twitter YouTube Website

Mark Galeotti posted: ” This is a summary of the discussion at the most recent of the online Russia Hybrid Seminar Series (RHSS) webinars held on 15 June 2021 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The speakers ” Respond to this post by replying above this line New post on In Moscow’s Shadows Biden-Putin Geneva Summit, June 16, 2021 by Mark Galeotti This is a summary of the discussion at the most recent of the online Russia Hybrid Seminar Series (RHSS) webinars held on 15 June 2021 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The speakers were Mark Galeotti of Mayak Intelligence/UCL/RUSI and Pavel Baev of PRIO, and the discussion was moderated by Graeme Herd of the GCMC. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. RHSS#6, June 15, 2021 ‘Biden-Putin Geneva Summit, June 16, 2021’ Central Proposition: Russia’s confrontation with the U.S. is now the norm; relations with the EU have deteriorated to a record low and will continue to remain there; and offensive cyber operations as well as active measures against the political West are ongoing and likely unremitting.  The strategic interests of Russia and the West are incompatible and irreconcilable. Context: Characterizing U.S. Policy to Russia: There is a transatlantic consensus for a targeted “pushback” against the Kremlin’s malign activity and influence and to build resilience in defense of shared core democratic values and practices. This approach suggests targeted ‘Containment 2.0’, in that it seeks to contain (or constrain) Russian aggressive and malign strategic behavior within “stable and predictable” lines. The U.S. and Europe can coordinate approaches to “impose real costs” to reduce Russian military and diplomatic efficacy through disruption. Disruption can cause friction, overextend and unbalance Russia and thereby control Russian escalation and deter further malign activity. The tools at the disposal of the U.S. and its friends and allies that facilitate the imposition of costs are varied and context specific. These tools can be diplomatic, economic and cyber. Diplomatic tools include “attribution diplomacy” (“name and shame”), diplomatic expulsions, and closing diplomatic properties. Economic tools are also varied.  Tariffs, full embargoes and restrictions on technology sales necessary for hydrocarbon exploration and production, could shape Russia’s malign strategic behavior. Cyber tools can be used to reveal or freeze Russian leaders’ foreign assets and expose corruption and a policy of “defend forward” or “hack back” can be used. In public diplomacy terms, the West can restructure the narrative from Putin’s preferred image of Russia as a besieged fortress encircled by an aggressive, dysfunctional, and failed West to one about a Russian kleptocracy and oligarchy (“Kremlin blacklist”) versus Russian civil society. As well as countering Russia directly, the West needs to invest in narratives that point to the advantages that liberal and democratic practices can offer, and the connections between rule of law, transparency and accountability with development, progress, peace and stability, as well as help countries build their capacity and strengthen their statehood (sovereignty and territorial integrity). A ‘theory of change’ underpins sanctions against the Russian oligarchic business elite close to Putin. Sanctions are designed not to crash the Russian economy or force regime change, but rather to impose a cost on those sanctioned, and thereby change Russian strategic behavior from destabilizer to constructive international relations actor. Context: Characterizing Russian Policy towards the U.S. Anti-Americanism is not a temporary phenomenon: “Putin and his anti-Western rhetoric remain popular in Russia precisely because he expresses a view widely held domestically (and reinforced by ceaseless anti-Western propaganda).” Putin, himself subject to emotional neuralgias, has proved a master at exploiting the dominant phobias, expectations, myths and emotions of Homo sovieticus, mainly because he himself shared them and so could ride “the wave of the public disorientation, frustration, resentment, and diffused aggression.” Confrontation with the West are not based on misperceptions: Confrontation is hard-wired into Russia’s foreign policy and current strategic behavior is unlikely to change.  As Pavel Baev observes: “Every step in bolstering solidarity among Western democracies and in upholding democratic values constitutes a threat to the existence of this corrupt autocracy, and no détente or a “reset” can possibly mitigate that threat in the Kremlin’s eyes.” In reality, Russia is too weak for the U.S. to recognize as an equal, too strong to be willing and able to accept unequal tactical allay status. Russia explains its failure to gain recognition as a product of the U.S.’s determination to oppose it through “containment”. In February 2021, President Putin noted the United States’ “so-called containment policy towards Russia.” He stated: “This is not competition as a natural part of international relations, but a consistent and highly aggressive policy aimed at disrupting our development, at slowing it down and creating problems along our external perimeter and contour, provoking internal instability, undermining the values that unite Russian society, and ultimately, at weakening Russia and forcing it to accept external management, just as this is happening in some post-Soviet states…”. In May 2021, at an online meeting of the UNSC Sergei Lavrov stated that Moscow views as unacceptable attempts by the U.S. and the EU to impose “totalitarianism”. Lavrov argued that Western countries instrumentalize the notion of a “rules-based order” and sanctions as a substitute of the norms of international law to prevent the process of the formation of a polycentric world.  Later that month, at a Russian-German Potsdam Meeting forum, he accused Germany of stepping up its containment policy toward Moscow: “We have to admit that Berlin has only intensified its policy of systemic containment of Russia.” Russia leverages unintended consequences of U.S. pushback: Putin can profit from sanctions by redistributing resource rents to strengthen the existing system and elite cohesion. Sanctions provide an alibi for economic downturn and encourage de-dollarization of SWF by end of June, use of a digital rouble and other alternatives to SWIFT.  The “theory of change” that animates Western policy appears unproven. Attribution diplomacy can be ineffective when siloviki in Russia have de facto immunity from prosecution.Adverse publicity can intimidate opponents, instruct, and educate society into submission, be worn as a badge of loyalty and have a rally round the flag effect.  Information secrecy in Russia is justified as is greater KGB-SVR cooperation “to counter Western destabilization”. Geneva Summit, 16 June 2021 White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan and Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev met in Geneva for preparatory talks. Sergei Lavrov characterised the talks as “frank” and showing a potential to “remove certain irritants” in bilateral relations and “covered the entire spectrum of our relations, similar to our discussion with Secretary of State Anthony Blinken a week earlier in Iceland”. Engagement with Putin’s Russia poses dilemmas and difficult choices.  While this coercion-plus-dialogue statecraft approach to Russia may better manage conflicts and disputes at lower risk and is supported by allies (Charap, 2021), a trade-off exists between widening negotiations to create leverage between issues areas, and increasing the legitimacy of the Putin regime through high level dialogues and summits. (Petrov, 2021) What does Putin want? A legitimizing spectacle that raises his profile, underscores Russia’s Great Power status and suggests Russian power plays win external recognition and acknowledgement.  “Biden’s initiative on granting Putin the privilege of a personal meeting, which incentivized Russia to reduce military tensions with Ukraine—but also paved the way for Gazprom to complete the construction of the geopolitically divisive Nord Stream Two natural gas pipeline.” (Baev) President Biden’s conditional offer of “stable and predictable” relations should Russia refrain from malign activity is problematic for Russia, as to be both stable and predictable is to be strategically irrelevant.  In most policy areas, excepting perhaps the Arctic, Russia seeks to be stable but unpredictable to maintain its strategic relevance.  For Russia, Belarus is very unstable but Russian support very predictable.  Ukraine is stable and unpredictable and the Middle East neither stable or predictable. Likely agreement to start discussions on strategic stability re strategic offensive and defensive weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons and even space. Given that the larger the agenda, the lengthier and more complex the talks will be, the greater the ability of Russia to shape the agenda, and define the parameters. The talks become an end in and of themselves: political theatre and stagecraft trumps statecraft. Emotional neuralgias of a mature autocracy are central to the Summit: grievance and resentment that the “empire was taken from us” animate Putin’s inner circle. (Galeotti, 2021)  The Summit presents an opportunity to push back and a chance to lay down red lines.  Discussion of Russian domestic affairs (the escalation of repression) is considered off-limits, as are granting Ukraine NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) status, or attempts to deny Russia its “rightful role.” Putin is not an anarchist: he only opposes the notion of a rules based order when he feels Russia does not have a say in their formulation and implementation.  These feelings make it harder to convince Putin that current frameworks work to Russia’s advantage. It is in Russia’s interest not to highlight its partnership with China as this detracts from Russia’s standing and draws attention from the uniqueness of a forum where China not strategically relevant. The inclusion of Dmitry Kozak (Russia’s chief negotiator in relations with Kyiv and Moscow-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine) and Alexander Lavrentyev (Russia’s Special Presidential Envoy for Syria) in the Russian team may indicate that Ukraine and Syria are on the agenda.  President Zelensky is nervous that the U.S. may not be a reliable partner, while the slow implosion of Belarus and its increasing dependence on Russia relieves some of the pressure Russia imposes on Ukraine. Disclaimer: This summary reflects the views of the authors (Pavel Baev, Mark Galeotti and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments. Mark Galeotti | June 16, 2021 at 5:44 am | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: https://wp.me/pjjTl-1rS Comment    See all comments    Like Trouble clicking? Copy and paste this URL into your browser: https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2021/06/16/biden-putin-geneva-summit-june-16-2021/

Mark Galeotti posted: ” Oh, the grand old Duke of YorkHe had ten thousand menHe marched them up to the top of the hillAnd he marched them down again There’s a fair amount of bemusement about the news that Russia is scaling down its troop build up around Ukraine. As ever,” New post on In Moscow’s Shadows The Grand Old Sergei Shoigu, He Had 10(0),000 Men… by Mark Galeotti Oh, the grand old Duke of York He had ten thousand men He marched them up to the top of the hill And he marched them down again There’s a fair amount of bemusement about the news that Russia is scaling down its troop build up around Ukraine. As ever, this provides an opportunity for everyone to spin their favoured line. For some, it’s that Putin “won” by getting Biden to offer a summit. For others, that Putin was deterred by US sanctions. The former has some merit, the latter much less so. I think it’s a little more complex. Defence Minister Shoigu himself announced the spin-down: “I believe that the goals of the snap inspection have been fully achieved.” Given that “the troops demonstrated the ability to reliably defend the country” then “I have decided to complete the Southern and Western military district reviews.” Of course, the exercises and snap inspections to which he is referring where actually retroactive justifications for the concentration of forces, so we ought not to give this too much credit. However, there was never a great likelihood of a major offensive by the Russians. (Lest this sound like I am being wise after the event, here’s something I wrote for BNE Intellinews at the start of the month.) First of all, there were questions about the adequacy of the logistics present – there was a lot of front-line hardware, very ostentatiously assembled, but armies march on their stomachs, fuel bowsers, ammunition depots and field kitchens, too. Secondly, with the Ukrainian military now numbering some 250,000 men and woman, and having gone through quite an effective reform process, while no one could doubt the Russians’ capacity to make local or even major advances, there would be serious casualties. With a distinct lack of enthusiasm at home, and elections looking, why would Putin risk the backlash from a bloody and unpopular conflict? Those who talked about Putin trying to provoke a crisis to generate a rally-round-the-flag effect thoroughly misunderstand Russia’s mood, I think. But most fundamental of all, what would the political aim of any major escalation be? Wars are fought for a reason. The perennial talk of driving a land bridge to Crimea, or seizing the North Crimea Canal, or degrading the Ukrainian military, none of them were credible, especially when offset against the inevitable and massive costs of sanctions, let alone military reversals. Even Berlin, that has so resolutely fought to keep the 95%-complete Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline unconnected from the political scene, would have been hard-pressed to maintain this stance if Russian tanks were driving into Ukraine, and Russian aircraft in Ukrainian skies. So what was this about? I felt this was about a concatenation of three factors Late April is when the campaign season always starts, as thaw muds dry, and each year we get then “OMG, Russia’s going to invade” chorus, especially from certain quarters in DC. Sure, this concentration of forces was unusual, but some escalation is normal. Zelensky’s new shift towards attacking “pro-Moscow” forces at home, not least to shore up his flank from the nationalists, was perceived as a hostile move in the Kremlin, and one that demanded punishment The Kremlin is unhappy with the Donbas status quo, and has been for a while, and the operation was an attempt to push Kyiv towards renewed negotiations on Moscow’s terms. We probably would have seen this kind of move last year, had COVID not disrupted everything. As is, there has been no such renewal of negotiations – to be blunt, that was never on the cards, but Moscow is both optimistic and often misreads Kyiv. However, the Russians tend to be flexible in their iterative assessments of costs and benefits. By now Kyiv is clearly not going to shift Biden has offered Putin a summit, which speaks to a primal need to be treated as the US’s equal or at least a necessary interlocutor. The Kremlin probably feels it forced this on him, just as the 2015 Syrian intervention pushed Obama into meeting Putin at the UN. Russia has made the point that it can quickly assemble massive forces in-theatre, and at a time when Ukraine’s requests to join NATO are likely to be met with the most polite of rain checks, it emphasises to Kyiv that what didn’t happen this time, could easily happen next time The hawks are left off-balance, and next time they start predicting Russian aggression, whether in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia or wherever, Moscow can point to the 2021 Ukraine Offensive That Never Happened, whether to defang them, or to keep people guessing in case there is a real attack planned that time As is, Moscow likely feels it got enough out of the operation compared with the costs of either extending the build up or moving onto the offensive, that it can be satisfied with the result. And the 58th Army of the Southern Military District, the 41st Army of the Central Military District, and the 7th and 76th Airborne Assault and 98th Airborne Divisions all got a good workout. Mark Galeotti | April 22, 2021 at 11:36 am | Categories: Uncategorized | URL: https://wp.me/pjjTl-1rv Comment    See all comments    Like Trouble clicking? Copy and paste this URL into your browser: https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2021/04/22/the-grand-old-sergei-shoigu-he-had-100000-men/