SCSS Berlin Workshop, 24 May 2022 Summary

 

Call a randomly selected number in Russia (squad303)

https://sms.1920.in/

Mariupol pictures (click to view all)

Auf zum Endspurt EBI Grundeinkommen!

 

 

image006.jpg

 

image007.png

 

Liebe Unterstützer*innen des Grundeinkommens,

 

insbesondere in Italien, Spanien und in Deutschland hat sich in den letzten Tagen viel bewegt – es gab einen großen Zuwachs an Unterzeichnungen zur Europäischen Bürgerinitiative (EBI) Grundeinkommen. https://eci.ec.europa.eu/014/public/#/screen/home

 

Wir brauchen aber noch mehr. Am 25. Juni 2022 endet die Möglichkeit zu unterzeichnen.

 

Daher unsere Bitte: Informieren Sie in den kommenden Tagen Freundinnen und Freunde, Kolleginnen und Kollegen und Familienangehörige, aber auch Mitstreiterinnen und Mitstreiter in den Organisationen und Initiativen, in denen Sie aktiv sind. Bitten Sie um Mitunterzeichnung: https://eci.ec.europa.eu/014/public/#/screen/home

 

Weitere Infos zur EBI Grundeinkommen finden sich hier: https://www.ebi-grundeinkommen.de/

 

Noch etwas: Es können kostenfrei EBI-Flyer und -Plakate zum Verteilen bei uns bestellt werden. Schreiben Sie uns unter dem Betreff „EBI – Endspurt“ eine E-Mail an office@grundeinkommen.de und nennen darin die gewünschte Anzahl an Flyern (ab 100 Stück) und Plakaten (ab 5 Stück). Hier können Sie auswählen: https://www.ebi-grundeinkommen.de/material/. Bitte geben Sie in der Mail neben der gewünschten Stückzahl auch das Format der Flyer bzw. der Plakate an, Ihren Namen, Ihre Telefonnummer und Anschrift wegen möglicher Rückfragen an. Auch können Sie selbstverständlich den Flyer unseres Netzwerks bestellen (bis zu 500 Stück). 

 

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

 

Netzwerkrat des Netzwerks Grundeinkommen

www.grundeinkommen.de

 

 

 
image005.png

 

Verein zur Förderung des bedingungslosen Grundeinkommens e.V.

Schönhauser Allee 163
10435 Berlin 


kontakt@grundeinkommen.de
www.grundeinkommen.de

GLS Bank
IBAN: DE63 4306 0967 4022 6215 00
BIC: GENODEM1GLS
Kontoinhaber: Verein zur Förderung des bedingungslosen Grundeinkommens e.V.

 

 

A new Russia based on crypto currency

EU border chief forced to step down

          EU border chief forced to step down

The EU border protection agency faces scrutiny over migrant ‘pushbacks’
EU border chief forced to step down

The European Union’s top border protection official has resigned following claims that years of rights abuses occurred under his watch, including alleged mistreatment of migrants who arrive in the bloc’s territory.

Fabrice Leggeri, a French national who headed up the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, commonly known as ‘Frontex,’ confirmed his departure in a statement obtained by several media outlets on Friday.

“I give my mandate back to the Management Board as it seems that [the] Frontex mandate on which I have been elected and renewed in late June 2019 has silently but effectively been changed,” he said.

While a European anti-fraud agency launched a probe into the abuse allegations last year, its findings have yet to be made public. However, investigations by a consortium of regional media outlets have indicated that Frontex was aware of at least 22 cases of migrant ‘pushbacks,’ when immigration authorities simply forced asylum seekers, arriving by boat, back out to sea.

The 22 ‘pushbacks’ were conducted by both Frontex and Greek officials and involved more than 950 migrants, all occurring between March 2020 and September 2021, the media outlets reported – among them Germany’s Der Spiegel, France’s Le Monde, Switzerland’s SRF et Republik and investigative NGO Lighthouse Reports.

Frontex convened an emergency meeting on both Thursday and Friday to address allegations against Leggeri and two other staffers at the agency. The former Frontex chief has denied the charges in the past, and the European Parliament issued a report on the matter last year.

“The management board took note of his intentions and concluded that the employment has therefore come to an end,” Frontex said in a statement, adding that Leggeri formally resigned on Thursday.

Defined as any government policy in which “migrants are forced back over a border…without consideration of their individual circumstances and without any possibility to apply for asylum,” EU law prohibits ‘pushbacks’ over concerns they will place human lives in danger, as many migrants show up in unseaworthy boats and rafts following lengthy voyages. International law also generally bans “refoulement,” or the forcible return of refugees to a country where they may be at risk of persecution.

assange

Assange extradition order issued by UK court
The Australian-born journalist is facing an effective life term on American soil, if the decision is signed off by Home Secretary
Assange extradition order issued by UK court
Julian Assange. © Getty Images / Carl Court

A magistrates court in London has issued a formal order to extradite WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange to the US to face espionage charges there, and a possible effective life imprisonment. Wednesday’s ruling may be appealed.

The Westminster Magistrates’ Court decision reverses its previous ruling that denied the US extradition to the US based on Assange’s poor mental state and the harsh conditions in American high-security prisons. UK Home Secretary Priti Patel will need to authorize the extradition before it can be executed.

WikiLeaks editor-in-chief Kristinn Hrafnsson said the UK court was issuing a “death sentence” to Assange by passing its decision. He is facing up to 175 years in prison under the espionage charges he faces in the US indictment.

The legal team defending Assange said it will make representations to Secretary Patel, asking for a chance to make an appeal against the court order. The lawyers said they may appeal to the High Court, even if the secretary grants the extradition.

The previous British rejection of the extradition request was issued by the same court in January 2021. The American side successfully appealed the decision by challenging the testimony of defense experts, and by offering to give formal assurances that Assange would not be put under the worst security regime during his prosecution in the US.
Julian Assange: From liberal darling to public enemy no. 1
Read more
Julian Assange: From liberal darling to public enemy no. 1

Assange, who is best known for his organization’s pro-transparency activism and its publication of leaked classified documents, which has exposed the dark secrets of many governments, has been in British custody since April 2019. He is kept at the high-security Belmarsh prison, dubbed “British Guantanamo” for its role as the incarceration site of the most dangerous criminals in the UK. He had previously spent seven years locked inside Ecuador’s embassy in London, before a new government in Quito revoked his asylum.

During his self-exile at the embassy, the US unsealed its case against Assange and filed a request to the UK to hand him over for prosecution.

The prosecution in Britain has sparked international criticism against the British government by advocates of media freedom. Assange supporters see him as a prisoner of conscience, who is being persecuted by Washington and London for his work as a publisher. The precedent sends a chilling message to any journalist wishing to investigate misconduct by Western governments that their lives may be ruined in retribution, critics said.

On March 23, Assange married Stella Moris, with whom he has two children. The ceremony was conducted inside the prison, and only a limited group of people was allowed to attend.
READ MORE: Aim of Assange’s prosecution is to ‘scare others’ – Rafael Correa to RT

Julian Assange has been a target for the US since 2010, when Wikileaks published a trove of State Department cables and Pentagon documents that depicted alleged war crimes committed by US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. He has been accused of attempting to hack Pentagon computers and has been charged under the Espionage Act, which prohibits obtaining information related to national defense which can be used to undermine US interests or benefit foreign nations.

Assange has denied all the charges against him, with his legal defense team arguing that he had not been under US jurisdiction and had engaged in completely legal journalism. They also deny allegations of conspiring to hack Pentagon computers, insisting that the case is based on discredited testimony of the convicted Icelandic criminal ‘Siggi the Hacker’.

Weiger de huurverhoging

WWDHV-Poster-Final_Export

Turkish court suspends kashoggi trial, confirms transfer to Saudi Arabia (click for video)

Masyanya wakizazhi

Rusland eist betaling in roebels. Russisch Ministerie van financiën krijgt een week om ervoor te zorgen dat roebels beschikbaar komen voor huidige afnemers!

War stagnation signals Ukraine is fighting for full stakes? Day 25. (click to play)

RSS#5, 21 March 2022: “Russia and Ukraine: Negotiated Settlement and End State?” 

by Mark Galeotti

This is a summary of the discussion at the latest workshop of the current series of online Russia Seminar Series (RSS) webinars held on 21 March 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. Please note that Mark Galeotti is only hosting these useful summaries and can claim no credit for compiling them.

Context

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appears stalled, giving space for political negotiations. However, there are two wars that need to be addressed: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s war with the West.  In the first war, the issues include: 1) “neutrality”; 2) “security guarantees”; 3) de-militarization; 4) “de-nazification”; and 5) the nature of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  Russia’s combat operations have stalled.  Forceful breakthrough in several directions are unsuccessful.  The siege of Kyiv incomplete, as the visit by three European prime ministers demonstrated.  On 21 March President Zelensky stated that Ukraine will not bow to ultimatums from Russia and that Ukrainian cities under attack will not accept occupation. At the same time he urged direct talks with President Putin, saying:Without this meeting it is impossible to fully understand what they are ready for in order to stop the war.”  As a Ukrainian Jew whose relatives died in the Holocaust, his address to the Israeli Knesset compared Russian actions with that of the Nazi’s. Russian propaganda asserting the opposite fails to gain traction outside of Russia.

Russia’s ultimata to the US and NATO in December 2021 in the guise of diplomacy prefigured a recasting of the war in Ukraine as one between the “collective West” (‘Empire of lies’) and Russia (‘Truth and Justice’).  In this telling, articulated by Putin at Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow on 18 March 2022, the West carries out “total war” against Russia using a “fifth column” consisting of “national traitors” with “slave consciousness”, as well as information warfare and economic sanctions. According to this understanding, Ukraine is a puppet, under “external control on the part of the West”. For President Putin, Russia is in an existential struggle for its sovereignty, its right to be itself, and so fights a necessary and heroic war of defense. Such military-patriotic mobilization through “total war” propaganda makes up for lost time: Putin had continuously asserted that Russia did not seek war and Russian society was not therefore mobilized to support war prior to the invasion.

Ukraine-Russia Political Settlement

Russia insists that Ukraine adopts a neutral military status, with Russia’s lead negotiator Vladimir Medinsky stating that Russia desires a: “peaceful, free, independent Ukraine that is neutral and not a member of a military bloc, not a member of NATO.” President Zelensky accepts non-NATO membership as a reality: NATO is “not ready to accept Ukraine for at least 15 more years”. The question then is which neutrality model does Ukraine adopt – the Swiss model of armed neutrality and territorial defence – or the non-aligned Finnish and Swedish models, that include EU membership, with its increasingly meaningful Common Foreign and Security Policy. Although the EU as a regulatory and normative geo-economic superpower united in sanctions against Russia poses the greatest danger for rent-based patronal ‘Putinism’, Putin himself may not understand this reality.

A second focus in the discussions is on security guarantees “for all participants in this process”.  Thus a neutral Ukraine would seek guarantees for the “complete security for Ukraine for the time that NATO is not ready to accept us”. Mykhailo Podolyak, Ukraine’s chief negotiator, notes that this: “suggests that there will be no bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine, but rather a multilateral agreement, a package agreement that a number of countries will take part in — their number is still being discussed. [But it will be] five to seven countries.”States mentioned as guarantors include nuclear power states – UK, France and US – as well as Turkey, Poland, and Israel.  However, how these guarantors punish potential future violators have yet to be defined, and given the failure of the generic Budapest guarantees, identifying specific responses for specific violations may help make the process more credible and reconcile Kyiv to it. Russia itself would need “security guarantees” – but guarantees of what and by whom?  This factor does underscore that two peace processes are interlinked.

Russia seeks “demilitarisation” of Ukraine so that “no threats to the Russian Federation ever come from its territory”.  The size and capability of Ukraine’s military is a topic for discussion.  If Ukraine adopts armed neutrality with security guarantees, this suggests that Ukraine would be armed to the extent that it could defend itself from and so deter future aggressors. This in turn implies a range of air-land-battle capabilities and integrated air-defense systems in place.  Limited and symbolic third party border monitoring missions might also ensure demilitarization and act as a security guarantee.  All Russian military forces would withdraw from the territory of Ukraine, raising questions regarding Ukraine’s territorial integrity and borders.  Ukraine’s post-settlement model may well be Israel.  That is, heavily militarized, with a sense of self based on military vulnerability, but with strong external guarantees.

President Putin continues to speak of “denazification” which supports his framing in terms of the Great Patriotic War, while Foreign Minister Lavrov referenced the “termination of nazification policy” in Ukraine.  “Denazification” suggests regime change, with ‘regime’ understood in terms of current political and military leadership in Ukraine as well as policies.  The “termination of nazification policy” may be understood in terms of alegal regime and refer to “discriminatory legislation” and restrictions on Russian language, education, culture, and mass media in Ukraine. Russia’s narrative around a “special military operation” to “protect the Russian-speaking population” against a Ukrainian Nazi regime encompasses both interpretations.

Territorial issues may be subject to de facto and de jure recognition compromises with regards to Donbas and Crimea but not ‘the South’.  For Donbas, Russia has rrecognized both Luhansk and Donetsk as independent states according to their de jure 2014 administrative borders.  Ukraine will likely insist on the de facto borders of 22 February 2022.  Will it settle for the de facto borders by time of settlement?  With Crimea, Russia would likely insist on the official recognition of Crimea a permanent part of Russia either immediately or through another referendum, this time with international recognition?  President Zelensky has referenced a “Crimea compromise” which suggests that de jure the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (the ARK) is still legally part of Ukraine but de facto Ukraine would work with the current reality.  However, in ‘the South’ Russia will seek to maintain the seized North Crimea canal (water security for Crimea) and the land corridor to Donbas, making the Sea of Azov a Russian lake. Russia has begun moves on creating a Kherson Peoples Republic and Mariupol Peoples Republic.  For Ukraine trading Mariupol for a wider peace may be a bridge too far.

Culmination Points

  • Progress in the war has an effect on the respective strengths and confidence of both sides.  We can look to the culmination of Russian military and diplomatic tracks regarding its aggression in Ukraine and the knock-on effects for Russia’s economy and popular and “inner circle” support for Putin.  Does Russia meet an impasse or stalemate where continuation forward is no longer possible?  Does this then allow for an operational pause and regroup and provide time to mobilize support for a wider war?
  • If Russia suffered the isolation and destruction of several battalion tactical groups due to over extended supply lines, encirclement and annihilation, might this tactical defeat resonate on other Russian fronts, leading to collapse, compounded by steady military losses, exhaustion and low morale (as evidenced in the Kostroma 331st Guards Airborne Regiment and 138th motorized rifle brigade)? Alternatively, might Russia escalate to negotiate from a position of greater strength, seeking the formal capitulation of Mariupol or capture of Kharkiv, Sumy, or Mykolaiv as bargaining chips in the negotiations?  Might an unexpected Russian break through lead to the belief that “just one more push” leads to victory? This mindset that brought ruin to the Russian army in World War I.
  • In Ukraine, 2020-2021 sociological surveys demonstrated public opinion leaning towards integration with the EU and NATO. War has increased Ukrainian support for pro-Western policies and the Ukrainian language, identity, self-belief.  On 18 March 2022 Rating sociology group carried out a survey via Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews with 1,000 respondents above the age of 18 in all regions of Ukraine except those currently occupied: 96% believe that Ukraine will repel Russia’s attack.  On 21 March President Zelensky stated that the final format for compromises on “security guarantees” and the temporarily occupied territories in the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia may be put to an all-Ukrainian referendum.  This mechanism may also facilitate implied changes to Ukraine’s constitution.
  • Might vertical escalation through the use of a non-strategic nuclear weapon(s) be used to break the impasse and improve Putin/Russia’s negotiation position?  Russia appears unlikely to escalate in this manner for a number of reasons: 1) the impossibility for NATO allies not to have a direct military response and actively consider regime change; 2) the technical difficulties involved in the delivery; 3) a pragmatic Putin fearing his orders might not be carried out chooses not to; 4) the loss of external support – China being critical – as Russia moves from pariah to isolated rogue state status; 5) a staged nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya after withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would have the same escalatory signally effect without the risks associated with Ukraine.
  • The spring 2021 conscription draft represents a tipping point.  As Russia dragoons a new wave of conscripts, draft dodging may prove an indirect indicator of popular support for the war, or lack of it.  In addition, once conscripts complete their one year service they are released into society as live witnesses of the realities in Ukraine.  Might Russia be tempted to extend conscription and undertake “national mobilization of personnel and industry”?  Would this emergency move cause societal backlash and unrest, as well as damage the narrative of a “special military operation” going “according to plan”? Does the deployment of Rosgvardiya for controlling the occupied territories leave too little capacity for managing anti-war movements in Russia itself?
  • Deficiencies in Russia’s way of war are evident. The Russian military was unprepared for a multi-axis attack against determined resistance.  The centrality of Putin to Putin’s war is highlighted by his portrayal as a popular war leader, though this popularity may be Potemkin-like. Putin is selling “victory” to the Russian public and his “inner circle”, but are they buying?  If so, at what price?  Putin sought to restore Slavic unity.  He breaks it, loses Ukraine and returns Russia to a 1970s “Brezhnev 2.0” construct, with differences: Russia is in open confrontation with the West not competition, is more ideological, weaker and less stable.  Coups in Russia – Khrushchev in 1964 or Gorbachev in August 1991 – occur when there is a confluence of opinion in Russian military, KGB and political elites.  Has Putin ensured through elite surveillance and a lack of collective institutions that this terminal culmination point is not reached? For now elite opposition manifests itself as passivity and lack of support rather than the active determination to be first mover in the removal of a paranoid and isolated but not yet a fully Potemkin-Putin: “Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown”. (King Richard IV, Part 2, Act 3, Scene 1).

GCMC, March 22, 2022.

Disclaimer: This summary reflects the views of the authors (Pavel Baev, Mark Galeotti and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.

Mark Galeotti | March 22, 2022 at 5:11 am | Categories: Uncategorized| URL: https://wp.me/pjjTl-1wa

Zomaar een demootje

Remember victims of war: patapoe casts one minute of silence everyday at 15:00H CET