FY23 SCSS#3, 13 December 2022 – “Winter has Come!” Roundtable
In Moscow’s Shadows FY23 SCSS#3, 13 December 2022 – “Winter has Come!” Roundtable
Mark Galeotti
This is a summary of the discussion at the latest workshop of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 13 December 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. Please note that Mark Galeotti is only hosting these useful summaries and can claim no credit for compiling them.
Introduction
This year our Strategic Competition Seminar Series (FY23 SCSS) activities will focus on the theme of alternative Ukrainian future trajectories and the implications these may have for Russia and the West. Much has been assumed about the impact of winter on Russia’s ability to advance its invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine’s ability to resist, Western unity and potentially on increased pressure for a ceasefire – but on whose terms? This roundtable examines these interlinked themes.
Winter War?
In general terms, Russia expects winter will break western solidarity and resolve, increase calls for ceasefire on Russian terms and undercut Ukraine’s morale and will to fight. Russian strikes against Ukraine’s energy grid have reduced in numbers but are sustainable through the winter and have a cumulative effect. An operational pause appears underway, akin to August 2022 before Ukraine’s lightning counter attack in September to retake Kharkiv region, as each side probes the other in search of weakness, vulnerabilities and opportunities. Ukraine makes small advances on the Svatove-Kremina line, for example, and undertakes long-range strikes against Russian supply nodes, while Russia makes slow incremental gains around Bakhmut.
When surveying Russian mainstream commentators and military bloggers, two other themes emerge: Russia makes advances at the front; Russia is vulnerable in its rear to long range Ukrainian strikes. These bloggers show a renewed confidence. They believe that Russia has regained the military initiative and advantage from the low point of 9 November Kherson “regrouping” announcement. Slow advances towards Bakhmut, it is argued, are not only proof positive of this proposition, but also demonstrate that Gen Surovikin’s recommendation, accepted by Defense Minister Shoigu, was the right one as it allowed Russian troops to withdraw to more defensive lines in the south and be redeployed to focus on expanding Russian territorial control of Donetsk region. Shortages of artillery munitions, this narrative argues, can and are being addressed. Newly mobilized and better trained battalions will be ready for a “Spring Offensive”.
The sense that time is on Russia’s side and that Russia’s military position is sustainable has taken hold. Three months into the mobilization announced on 22 September, we can see that overall it is having an effect: 50,000 are deployed, 250,000 to be deployed and the annual autumn draft generates another 100,000. These conscripts can only be deployed to Russian territory – which, in Russia’s eyes, includes occupied Ukraine. In reality, though, Russia continues to overestimate its own ability and underestimate Ukraine’s and so miscalculate the balance of forces. Differences are most stark in logistics, with Russia’s logistical supply chains broken. It is also very apparent that production in Russia’s defense industrial complex is very dependent on western component parts. Ten months into the war the Russian military has more able-bodied men but these new forces have less armor, heavy weapons and military equipment available to them. Russia is not ready to repel a Ukrainian winter offensive.
Repurposed Ukrainian Soviet-era targeting drones are successfully, if symbolically, capable of attacking a 1000km into Russia’s rear. The direct attack on a part of Russia’s nuclear triad (Russian strategic bombers at Engels airbase) is an unprecedented event and the expectation among commentators and bloggers was Russia would launch a very punishing response. This has yet to occur. In addition, the perception holds that Ukraine received green light from the Pentagon to launch the attack, used western supplied long-range missiles and received western targeting aid. Such targeting, the perception holds, was also in evidence in attacks on Saki airfield and Sevastopol in Crimea, the Moskva cruiser, Kerch bridge and Wagner PMC HQ in Luhansk. Another concern expressed is in the decline of the supply of Iranian drones for swarm attacks against Ukraine.
By some estimates, there is a 20-30% probability that Ukraine could launch an offensive in Zaporizhzhia region around late January-February 2023, but this would likely consist of gradual advances, both in order to reduce combat fatalities and because more robust Russian defenses make the kind of collapse that occurred in the Kharkiv region in September relatively unlikely. Ukraine’s military enjoys much better morale, winter warfare equipment and logistical supplies (in part due to shorter lines of communication). Russian missile attacks against civilians in cities force Ukraine to deploy its air defense to protect cities, opening the possibility that Russia deploys its air force against Ukraine’s military on the front lines, making continued western air defense assistance and support more generally a priority. Ukrainian morale remains high.
Continued European Solidarity?
Europe faces an unprecedented energy crisis as Russia supplied 25% of its crude oil, 40% of its gas supply and 50% of coal deliveries. Expectations around the potential magnitude of the crisis have not been met: the current situation is better than expected. Gas storage in Germany, for example, is at 90%, electricity supply is stable, and gasoline cheaper now than before the conflict (see chart below).
Although it is still early in the winter, we do have data and scenarios that indicate a high probability that there will be no shortage. (See Chart below)
A number of explanations account for this better than expected outcome. First, the EU’s energy market has functioned well, reducing consumption and brining new energy to Europe. Second, luck with external conditions is a factor, not least the weather a drop in Chinese consumption. Third, with few exceptions, the alignment of EU and national energy policies have prompted the filling of storages, commitments to energy conservation and the construction of new infrastructure. In a milestone achievement, the first ever LNG shipment (“Esperenza”) docks in Germany on 15 December 2022.
How can European populations and businesses be protected from the impact? The impact feels very different in different parts of Europe, depending energy systems, industrial consumption, and, most importantly, the fiscal ability of a state to shield its consumers. Despite policy not advancing in some areas, such as a gas price cap, heated bargaining and accusations, energy has not led to deeper divisions. Why? First, it is abundantly clear that what is at stake is extremely important. As a result, attempts to divide the EU at this critical time run the risks of paying a high political price. Second, the process of advancing energy policy is characterized by lots of bargaining, over, for example, sanctions, price caps, and subsidies. In this process, there is no single East-West, core-center, North-South cleavage in Europe but rather overlapping coalitions which generates stability.
How is societal cohesion impacted? It is difficult to measure social cohesion though protest can serve as an indirect indicator. In Prague in late October 2022 a protest gathering of 70,000 proved to be an outlie. In Germany, for example, there has been no large protest and support for the political party ‘Alternative for Germany’ peaked on this issue in October, when uncertainty and fear was at its highest. Lower gas prices and distractions, such as the world football championship and Christmas, are also factors. Attitudes, however, could change quickly. An unpredicted disaster, an attack by Russia on Norwegian pipelines, or a freak event generated by system stretched are all possible. In addition, Russian disinformation targeting Ukrainian refugees and host state populations may be a factor, particularly following a potential upsurge in refugees over winter if the Ukrainian energy grid collapses.
In the case of Germany, it is clear that this is Putin’s war and that blame for subsequent energy disruption is easily attributed. For this reason, energy will not be the factor that results in a trade “land for peace” compromise, allowing Russia to reconstitute its military, consolidate political control and perpetuate the conflict at a time of its choosing. In Germany, entrenched pacifism or fear of escalation (the issue of supplying German tanks to Ukraine is a case in point) could become problematic.
Winter Stalemate and Ceasefire?
Better than expected energy policies have mitigated the risk that “General Winter” would build western pressure that pushes Ukraine to accept a ceasefire on Russian terms. There is no prospect of peace talks this winter between Russia and Ukraine, but there is still a lot of talking going on. There are talks about talks, there are various talks about concrete issues that may have a wider impact on the conflict, and there are talks about avoiding escalation. There is therefore a gradual institutionalization of contacts, negotiated PoW exchanges, local ceasefires and vested interests in play that complicate the picture.
Talks about talks: A flurry of discussions in the media about talks in November may have proved divorced from the reality on the ground, but they did reflect real anxieties in the West about how to support Ukraine if the war dragged on through 2023. The New York Times, for example, reported different views on peace talks being aired inside the White House. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Mark Milley’s suggestion in November that Ukraine should be ready to contemplate negotiations with Moscow to consolidate its current gains on the ground met with a frosty response in Kyiv.
Ukraine’s position: Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Zaluzhny responded that “The Ukrainian military will not accept any negotiations, agreements or compromises” and named the Ukrainian condition for negotiations – the withdrawal of Russian troops from “all captured territories.” As Zaluzhny’s comments suggest, Ukraine’s military leadership has no interest in talks which would likely only consolidate Russia’s territorial gains and public opinion is supportive: at least 70% of Ukrainians want to continue to militarily resist Russian aggression. Ukraine believes it has a viable military option to end the war on its terms. But there are evidently different views in Kyiv. Although the maximalist public position – including the return of Crimea – is becoming difficult to step back from, in negotiations Ukraine could shift positions. Indeed, under pressure from Washington, President Zelensky has put more effort into a diplomatic track. He presented a 10-point peace plan at the G20 and has called for a Ukrainian Peace Formula Summit. Although the plan was largely a restatement of Ukraine’s war goals, it demonstrated an understanding of the importance of a political track. Ukraine is now trying to build on its proposals to conjure up more support – both in the West to help it survive the winter – and in the global south, where Ukraine recognizes Russia’s narrative has had some cut-through.
Russian position: Despite Russian rhetoric about being ready for talks, in reality Moscow only wants talk on its terms. An effective precondition for Russia is at a minimum de facto recognition by Ukraine of Russia’s existing territorial occupation. Speaking at a recent summit in Bishkek, Putin agreed that there would one day be a political settlement, but added that “all participants in this process will have to agree with the realities that are taking shape on the ground.” This sentiment was reiterated by Putin’s press spokesman Dmitry Peskov on 13 December, when he rejected Zelensky’s peace proposal and insisted that Ukraine must accept new “realities”.
Russia seems to believe that its aerial campaign against Ukraine combined with declining support from the West will eventually lead to talks on its terms, involving territorial concessions by Kyiv and the acceptance of constraints on a future Ukrainian state’s foreign, defense and domestic politics. Broadly speaking, Russia sees time on its side and predicts that in 2023 it will be much harder to sustain financial support to Ukraine. Eventually, Ukraine will crack.
But behind this unrealistic view there are signs of splits in elite opinion. The so-called patriotic camp appears to be increasingly divided about how to go forward. One wing of this camp is still hoping for various types of escalation to force Ukraine to capitulate – or just collapse – but there are also signs of a more realistic appraisal from some in the patriotic camp. This group accepted the military necessity of the withdrawal from Kherson and now advocates a resigned position of defending what Russia has already seized, while focusing attention on building up Russia’s defense and economy at home.
Zaporizhzhia. Even if talks about a peace deal are unlikely, there are few other channels opening up to discuss how to manage different aspects of the war. An example is the Zaporizhzhia power plant, where IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has been mediating talks between the two sides over establishing a “protection zone” around the plant. In theory, some kind of de-militarization of the site is possible but so far Russia has refused to withdraw its forces. Neither side trusts the other – and both have principled objections to any agreement that delegitimizes their territorial claims. The dispute is a microcosm of a wider dilemma for Ukraine. Any agreement on a protection zone around the plant that leaves Russian forces in place is a de facto ceasefire that legitimizes the Russian presence and allows them to consolidate control.
Ammonia for prisoners. Zaporizhzhia is not the only behind-the-scenes negotiation. Russian and Ukrainian delegations met on 17 November in Abu Dhabi to discuss resuming the export of Russian ammonia along a Soviet-era pipeline from Togliatti in Russia to Odesa (exports were halted after the war began) in exchange for a return of POWs. Russian ammonia exports were included in the grain deal agreed in July between Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the UN, but Ukraine is reluctant to allow Russian business to earn huge profits from ammonia exports through Odesa while Russia continues to bomb the city. These talks have not reached any agreement yet although there were further prisoner exchanges on 1 and 6 December.
Conclusions:
While the conflict is “mutually hurting”, a stalemate is not in evidence, far less exhaustion. A prolonged war of attrition by drone and missile attack may appear the default pathway, but it is not the only one. Putin has to escalate not to lose and Russian “victory-at-any-costs” rhetoric and targeting of cities and civilian infrastructure increases Ukraine’s will to resist and reject a ceasefire on Russian terms. Winter has not led to a strategic impasse. Fears of a grey-zone protracted inconclusive conflict characterized by operational exhaustion, war fatigue and the rise of a “give peace a chance” camp in Europe are not realized. Paradoxically, a high intensity fluid deadlock is in balance at break-point.
A deterioration of Russian military leadership and poor discipline, training and supply will generate significant impacts on Russia’s ability to generate deployable combat power, even come spring. Russia manages between 10-15 air sorties per day (a maximum of 20) which is inadequate given the scale of the conflict and does not allow aerial dominance. An opposite set of drivers appear the reality for Ukraine. Trust in the top leaders and wider Ukrainian institutions, such as the armed forces, emergency services and police, high morale and continued support for mobilization in defense of Ukrainian statehood are all in evidence. Ukraine has western trained specialized units, much better logistical chains and western military assistance tied to an operational plan. The strength of Ukrainian air defense explains the underperformance of the Russian air force. Western solidarity is boosted by effective energy policy responses to what had been dependence on Russian energy.
As Russia perceives that time is on its side, and is using an operational pause to regroup and reconstitute its military in order to launch new offensives in the spring, the incentives for a focused Ukrainian offensive in winter increase – with the probability over 50%. Major Ukrainian military advances would dramatically alter political positions, leading not just to the replacement of Gen Gerasimov, but badly damaging the political legitimacy of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief – that is, President Putin.
Disclaimer: This summary reflects the views of the authors (Pavel Baev, Dmitry Gorenburg, Janis Kluge and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of NATO, the United States, Germany, or any other governments.
GCMC, 14 December 2022.
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Une ligne de démarcation mortelle : La militarisation de la frontière ne conduit qu’a plus de morts dans la Manche
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Putin’s Retirement Speech (if only) and Whacky Kremlin Sitcoms
In Moscow’s Shadows Putin’s Retirement Speech (if only) and Whacky Kremlin Sitcoms
Mark Galeotti
There’s a fascinating AI (artificial intelligence) project currently openly available, ChatGPT, which allows you to ask the system to write texts on any topic in whatever style. As a momentary and welcome distraction, I played around with it.
First of all, I asked it to generate four ideas for a sitcom set in Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin. It came up with:
- “The Kremlin Komedians” follows a group of bumbling bureaucrats as they navigate the cutthroat world of Russian politics.
- “Putin’s Palace” centers on the personal and professional lives of the staff at the President’s official residence.
- “Kremlin Chaos” showcases the absurd and hilarious antics of the President’s advisors as they try to keep him in line.
- “The Putin Show” is a mockumentary-style sitcom that parodies the inner workings of the Kremlin, with Putin himself playing the lead role.
Then, I requested that the AI wrote a speech by Vladimir Putin in which he explains why he is retiring from office in the context of the war in Ukraine:
Dear fellow Russians,
Today, I am announcing my decision to retire from the office of President of the Russian Federation. This decision has not come easily, as I have devoted my entire life to serving our great nation. But after much contemplation and consideration, I have come to the realization that it is time for me to step down and allow fresh leadership to guide Russia into the future.
Over the past two decades, I have had the honor of leading Russia through some of the most challenging and transformative times in our history. We have faced economic hardships, global tensions, and political turmoil. But through it all, we have remained strong and resilient, and have emerged as a global power on the world stage.
However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has weighed heavily on my mind and on the hearts of the Russian people. Despite our best efforts to find a peaceful resolution, the situation has only grown more complex and dangerous.
It is with a heavy heart that I announce my decision to retire from office, in the hopes that a new leader will be able to bring fresh perspective and renewed efforts to the negotiations and peace talks in Ukraine.
I am confident that the future of Russia is bright. We have a strong foundation, a resilient people, and an unwavering commitment to our national interests. And with the right leadership, I am confident that we can continue to prosper and thrive in the coming years.
I want to thank each and every one of you for your support and dedication over the years. It has been a privilege to serve as your President, and I will always cherish the memories and experiences we have shared together.
I look forward to watching Russia continue to grow and flourish, and I am confident that the best days for our great nation are yet to come.
Thank you, and may God bless Russia.
Sincerely,
Vladimir Putin
Ah well, we can all dream, even if these are electric dreams…
PS, if anyone’s wondering about that image at the head of this post, there apparently is a game called Putin vs. Aliens: Extended Cut CyberPutin 2033 and then, as if there were not enough, CyberPutin 2077: Endgame (or Путин против Инопланетян: Финал), described as
In 2015, Vladimir Putin received a call from aliens, who said they would destroy the Earth. We didn’t have to wait for help from the West, because they were rotten. Therefore, Putin was not confused, and together with loyal friends punished the aliens in full!
Now, in 2020, it’s time for the final battle! Between stability and surprise, between the sun of all Russia V. V. Putin and God-fearing Aliens! In space!
In the game you will learn the secret of the origin of aliens, as well as get a unique gaming experience, because the game consists of four parts: Arcade, Strategy, RPG and, of course, Putin!And no, I haven’t played it.
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Fwd: ???? Bedrijventerrein is ondoordacht, verborgen maatschappelijke kosten en nieuwe motie
Update 13 Lutkemeerpolder – Voedselpark Amsterdam
28 november 2022Bekijk de webversie
Volg je ons al op social media? Voedselpark Amsterdam Twittert, Facebookt, Instagramt en LinkedInt dat het een aard heeft en is tegenwoordig ook op Mastodon te vinden. Volg je ons al op social media? Heel graag!
Deel ook vooral via je eigen kanalen je oproep over Voedselpark Amsterdam. #Voedselpark020 #StopDeVerdozing
politieke stand van zaken
Aan onze oproep om raadsleden te mailen is massaal gehoor gegeven. Dank daarvoor! Want het helpt: de politiek is gevoelig voor deze druk. We hebben nu steun van bijna alle partijen, behalve coalitiepartijen PvdA, GroenLinks en D66. Helaas heeft de motie om Voedselpark serieus te onderzoeken het net niet gered. Ook het voorstel om de wethouder met Voedselpark samen met andere belanghebbenden in gesprek te laten gaan werd gesteund door bijna alle partijen, behalve de coalitie, en is daarmee ook verworpen. In Nieuw-West reageerde het dagelijks bestuur met een inhoudelijke brief, waarin veel argumenten staan die wij in onze reactie ontkrachten.
Het verhaal dat het te veel kost is een gemakkelijk antwoord om niet te hoeven kijken naar de mogelijkheden. De vraag die wij stellen is: hoe kan het wel? Een groeiend aantal experts uit de wetenschap, het bedrijfsleven en de politiek doen het idee van Voedselpark niet langer af als ‘onmogelijk’ of ‘ondenkbaar’.
wij staan klaar
De brede burgerbeweging Voedselpark biedt middelen, kunde en kennis aan om een Voedselpark in de Lutkemeer te realiseren. Onze oproep aan het gemeentebestuur: Wij, de bewoners van deze prachtstad, staan klaar om mee te denken en mee te helpen, maar verwachten dat ook omgekeerd.
voedselpark in 2023
Begin november kwam het kernteam samen in De Boterbloem om te praten over de toekomst van Voedselpark, onze lobby en hoe we verder gaan met de actie om de grond te verwerven. In januari presenteren we ons stedenbouwkundig plan. Onze ruim 25 vrijwilligers focussen zich vanaf januari op de provinciale verkiezingen. Intussen zetten tien ondernemers eerste stappen naar een voedselpark coöperatie.
In december mailen we alle donateurs over onze toekomstige stappen en het vervolg van de crowdfunding. Eén ding kunnen we nu alvast verklappen: Voedselpark gaat door!. We hebben laten zien dat er draagvlak is voor een andere aanpak, er is alleen politieke moed voor nodig. Zolang het distributiecentrum er nog niet staat, geven we niet op en proberen we zo veel mogelijk vruchtbare grond te redden. De Lutkemeerpolder is en blijft de beste plek voor een Voedselpark in Amsterdam, maar desnoods gaan we ook op andere plekken aan de slag om te laten zien dat het kan.
achterhaald ondoordacht
Verkeersdeskundigen zetten grote vraagtekens bij de bouw van distributiecentra in de Lutkemeerpolder, schreef Het Parool twee weken geleden. Volgens wethouder Reinier van Dantzig zijn die noodzakelijk voor de bevoorrading van de stad, maar deskundigen noemen de plannen achterhaald en ondoordacht. Lees het artikel hier.
opslag en speculatie
In de polder zijn wederom voor twee kavels reserveringen gedaan. Onder andere voor een opslaglocatie, zoals Shurgard. Een toonbeeld van overconsumptie waar de Lutkemeerpolder voor opgeofferd zou moeten worden. Zoals Alies Fernhout in de raad van Nieuw-West zei: ‘We bouwen dus dozen voor mensen met te veel dozen.’ De bouwvergunning voor Proptimize / Citylink laat zien dat het doen van investeringen voorop staat: in 2 jaar hebben zij een portefeuille van €1 miljard opgebouwd aan distributiecentra in Nederland. De te bouwen locatie in de Lutkemeer staat in zijn geheel te huur.
Intussen presenteert ontwikkelaar SADC de asfaltweg als volgende stap in duurzame gebiedsontwikkeling, een bericht dat op LinkedIn voor de nodige consternatie zorgde.
verdozing in Nederland
“Sinds ik me inzet voor Voedselpark verbaas ik me over de ogenschijnlijk onstuitbare opmars van de XXL distributiecentra door het hele land. Als je googlet op #verdozing vind je een veelvoud van lokale actiegroepen en overal hetzelfde desperate verhaal”, aldus kernteamlid Natasha Hulst.
Overal proberen burgers hun leefomgeving te redden door zich verzetten tegen hun gemeente. “Het doet me denken aan de wanhoop van mensen in het Gronings aardbevingsgebied waar ook jarenlang te weinig aandacht voor was.”
Lees het hele verhaal op LinkedIn, dat met meer dan honderd reacties een landelijke discussie en een beweging op gang brengt .
English Where do we stand?
Our call to e-mail councilors got a massive response. Thank you to everyone who sent an email we know this is effective: politicians are sensitive to this pressure. We now have support from almost all council parties, except for the coalition parties PvdA, GroenLinks and D66. Unfortunately, the motion to seriously investigate the Voedselpark did not make it. The proposal to have the alderman Reinier van Dantzig talk to the Voedselpark together with other stakeholders was also supported by almost all parties, except for the coalition, and was therefore rejected.
In Nieuw-West, the ‘Stadsdeelraad’ responded with a long letter, containing many arguments that we debunk in our response. A growing number of experts from science, business and politics no longer dismiss the idea of Voedselpark as ‘impossible’ or ‘unthinkable’.
The story that its too expensive to stop, is too much of an easy answer , This is really just an excuse to not have to look at the possibilities. The question we want to answer: how can we make this possible? ? A growing number of experts from science, business and politics no longer dismiss the idea of Voedselpark as ‘impossible’ or ‘unthinkable’.
The broad citizen movement Voedselpark offers resources, skills and knowledge to realize a Voedselpark in the Lutkemeer. Our appeal to the municipal council: We, the residents of this beautiful city, are ready to look for solutions and help, but we also expect the same in reverse.
Future Voedselpark
At the beginning of November, the core team met in De Boterbloem to talk about the future of Voedselpark, our lobby and how we will proceed with the crowdfunding.
Our more than 25 volunteers have committed themselves will focus on the provincial elections from January. In January, together with urban planners and landscape architects, we will present a visually detailed and financially substantiated plan for the realization of Voedselpark Amsterdam: Voedselpark 2.0. In the meantime, ten entrepreneurs are taking their first steps towards a Voedselpark cooperative.
In December we will email all donors about our future steps and the continuation of the crowdfunding. We can already tell you one thing: Voedselpark will continue! We have shown that there is support for a different approach, it will take political courage. As long as the distribution center has not been built , we will not give up and will continue try to save as much fertile soil as possible. The Lutkemeerpolder remains the best place for a Voedselpark in Amsterdam, but if necessary we will also work in other places to show that it is possible
English below We are happy to include a summary of this newsletter in English as many of our English speaking supporters have expressed the wish to be kept up to date.
4.650 donateurs We zijn ongelooflijk dankbaar met 4.650 medestanders die samen al meer dan € 475.000 hebben gedoneerd.
De crowdfunding gaat door, stort een extra bijdrage en help ons de half miljoen te bereiken. Laat weten dat jij hebt gedoneerd en deel deze link!
direct doneren
maatschappelijke kosten Woensdag 30 november dient Partij van de Dieren een motie in om alle maatschappelijke kosten van de plannen voor de Lutkemeerpolder zichtbaar te maken. Waar wij enerzijds (gesteund door onderzoek van de WUR) betogen dat behoud van de polder miljoenen per jaar oplevert, zitten er anderzijds vele kosten ‘verborgen’ in de ontwikkeling van de Lutkemeer tot bedrijventerrein. Denk aan grote investeringen in infrastructuur en gezondheidsschade door toegenomen luchtvervuiling. Dit sluit aan bij de wens van het college voor true pricing. Dat betekent in dit geval dat je naast het financiële plaatje, ook de ecologische en sociale kosten en opbrengsten van een bedrijventerrein afweegt.
Help online mee! Je kunt ons helpen door raadsleden (vooral de coalitie D66, PvdA en GroenLinks) te mailen en er online zichtbaarheid aan te geven. Reageer bijvoorbeeld op Instagram accounts, Facebook, LinkedIn en Twitter berichten. Zo nodigt D66 bijvoorbeeld via de socials uit om vragen te beantwoorden; ga daar op in. Benoem de motie. Ga het gesprek aan en tag anderen. Wie durft en het kan: post een korte oproep- vlog. Als je actief bent bij PvdA, GroenLinks of D66, benader je eigen politici. Lees hier wat je nog meer kunt doen om de motie te steunen.
grond terug naar agrarisch De rechtbank gaat na vele omwegen het verzoek herziening bestemmingsplan eindelijk behandelen. Hopelijk weten we begin volgend jaar meer.
De wethouder heeft met een brief wel gereageerd op het verzoek. Lees hier de reactie namens Stichting Behoud Lutkemeer: “dit is hoe de corrupte hazen lopen“.
Hulp gezocht bij onze activiteiten Er ligt ongelofelijk veel werk dat we alleen kunnen doen dankzij de inzet van vrijwilligers. We zoeken mensen die minimaal 4 uur per week tijd hebben:
- doeners voor de activiteitencommissie: je helpt bij een rondleiding, een informatiemiddag, bij het flyeren of geeft een workshop
- netwerkers uit Nieuw-West: je hebt contacten in het stadsdeel en vindt het leuk om verbindingen te leggen
Interesse? Mail dan naar contact@voedselparkamsterdam.nl
Agenda Voedselpark Amsterdam Woensdag 14 december, 15.30 – 18.00
Commons Lab – Stadslandbouw in Nieuw-West
Debat over voedsel en grond en de kansen voor Voedselpark Amsterdam.
Ru Pare, Chris Lebeaustraat 4 in Amsterdam (1062DC)
Zondag 18 december, 13.00 – 14.30 uur
Een nieuw Lutkemeer-ommetje, dit keer olv gids Janneke. Kosten: Gratis, donaties altijd welkom. We verzamelen om 13 uur op het terras van De Boterbloem. Vooraf aanmelden niet nodig. De wandeling is voor iedereen met interesse in behoud van de natuur, stadslandbouw of biodiversiteit.
Zondag 18 december, 10.30 – 17.00 uur
Duurzame Tweedehands markt Sierplein
Op 18 december heeft Voedselpark Amsterdam ook een kraam op het Sierplein van 10.30 – 17.00. Het is een duurzame en 2e handsmarkt. We zoeken mensen die willen helpen om Voedselpark Amsterdam onder de aandacht te brengen. Wil je een paar uurtjes helpen mail dan naar activiteiten@voedselparkamsterdam.nl
Houd onze website in de gaten voor nieuwe activiteiten.
Reportage over corruptie in Lutkemeer en ontstaan van Voedselpark Wil je weten hoe het echt zit in de Lutkemeer? In een nieuwe reportage van Dr. Mokum (Emmanuel Zegeling) zie je de geboorte van Voedselpark Amsterdam, hoe de polder op corrupte wijze is verkocht en hoe de Amsterdamse politiek desondanks zijn poot stijf houdt.
Bekijk deze prachtige, onthutsende en leerzame reportage van Dr. Mokum hieronder
tipje van de sluier
Stedenbouwkundige Danny Edwards werkt aan een stedenbouwkundig plan voor Voedselpark Amsterdam: een visueel uitgewerkt en financieel onderbouwd plan. Hier een interview met Danny, waarin hij een tipje van de sluier oplicht. ‘Een groeiende stad heeft dit soort plekken keihard nodig’.
Follow us on LinkedIn Do join our current 800+ followers on our newly created LinkedIn account.
Contact Het kernteam is te bereiken via
info@voedselparkamsterdam.nl
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FY23 SCSS#2, 15 November 2022: “Militaries, Mercenaries, Militias and Morale and the Ukraine War”
In Moscow’s Shadows FY23 SCSS#2, 15 November 2022: “Militaries, Mercenaries, Militias and Morale and the Ukraine War”
Mark Galeotti
This is a summary of the discussion at the latest workshop of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 15 November 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. Please note that Mark Galeotti is only hosting these useful summaries and can claim no credit for compiling them.
Introduction
This year our Strategic Competition Seminar Series (FY23 SCSS) activities focus on the theme of alternative Ukrainian future trajectories and the implications these may have for Russia and the West. To this end, SCSS#2 identified and explored the impact of multiple militaries on Russia’s war fighting effort in Ukraine. Has Russia achieved ‘unity of command’ with the appointment of Gen Surovikin to overall commander of Russian forces fighting in Ukraine? How does theory of unified command differ from practice? What are the operational effectiveness implications of discrepancies between the two?
Russia’s Formal Chain of Command
The integrity of Russia’s military command is a constant issue. Russia’s multi-axis military invasion of Ukraine, initiated at 0400 CET on 24 February 2022, was led by multiple commanders. In October 2022 Gen Surovikin was appointed top Russian commander. However, unity of command has not appreciably strengthened. On paper Russia adopts a formal chain of unified command of the Russia Group of Forces for Special Military Operation in Ukraine. Gen Surovikin is the unified commander and as such is ultimately responsible for any resultant loss of operational effectiveness. Figure 1 outlines how in theory Russia’s formal chain of command should operate in Ukraine.
We can see that a wide variety of military actors are subordinated within this unified chain of command. It is difficult to verify with certainty thee current numbers of these actors as figures regarding ‘attrition rates’ and reconstitution with mobilized troops are not readily available. Approximations can be made and, given this, we should focus less on the exact figures and more on the relative balance between different units.
- Regular Military: c. 80,000 (?)
- Luhansk and Donetsk Peoples Republic (LDNR) Forces: c. 20,000 – these forces, the so-called 1st and 2nd Corps are very depleted and have been formally annexed into Russia’s regular military
- Opolcheniye (Militia): 3,000-13,000 (low/mid-range i.e. 5-6k likely)
- Wagner PMC: 1,000-8,000 (higher end likely) – heavy casualties but are also being reconstituted through a recruitment drive, including of Russian prisoners
- Rosgvardiya (National Guard): c. 17,000 (?) – includes elite OMON and other interior troops
- Chechens: 4-6 ‘battalions’ – 2,000-12,000 (lower end likely) – are formally supported to Rosgvardiya
The real chain of command
The Russian chain of command that appears to operate in practice in Ukraine is more chaotic and fragmentary than the theory suggests. This introduces needless friction into cooperation between different units and branches, limiting combined arms efforts, mutual logistical support and so operational effectiveness. Figure 2 highlights how in practice Russia’s informal chain of command does operate in Ukraine.
What are the notable differences between theory and practice?
- Wagner PMC is directly subordinated to Prigozhin and his military coordination cell. Gen Surovikin and the General Staff (the unified command) can request of Wagner troops but Prigozhin’s approval is needed as subordination to unified command would lead to the integration of Wagner into the regular military (institutionalization or ‘empire building’) leading to a loss of autonomy and control over his PMC for at least the duration of an open-ended conflict.
- Chechen forces in theory are subordinated to Rosgvardiya which in turn reports to the unified command. In practice, as with Wagner and Prigozhin, Kadyrov has direct control over his Kadyrovsky and counter-confirmation is needed if these units are ordered to change location.This de facto veto power addstime and friction to the decision-making and implementation process and so increases dysfunction on battlefield.
- Rosgvardiya units should be directly subordinated under the unified command. However, Zolotov has to counter-confirm major engagement and relocation orders, if only because Rosgvardiya commanders in Ukraine seek permission to avoid exposure. As with the other caveats, added time and friction hampers the operational effectiveness of Russian forces. – bitter competition over fuel and other necessary supplies and logistics
- LNR and DNR militias are in theory integrated into the regular Russian military and this in fact largely reflects practice.
Implications for Russian military operations
Russia’s ‘Unified Command’ is not unified and does not therefore command as it should. This lack of unity only exacerbates friction between the regular military, Rosgvardiya, Wagner, Kadyrovsky and militias. While it is difficult to assess the potential in combat effect if Russia would be able to realign its fragmented command structure, we can note shortcomings that arise from the current state of affairs.
- Outright conflict: there is suspicion that Wagner’s months long grinding assault on Bakhmut, strategic value, represents a means of the regular Russian military to control Wagner. However, given Wagner fights alongside the Marine Brigade of the Pacific Fleet (itself supplemented by newly mobilized middle-aged men), ‘disciplining’ and subordinating Wagner cannot be the whole story.
- Fragmented morale: it is harder to make broader assumptions about Russian morale as morale is not always fixed but can change. Factors such as logistics support, C3, battlefield losses and withdrawals, winter temperatures, and the falling quality of Russian officers all play a role. Officers are a key factor in whether troops stand and fight – unlikely if their officers are the first to run. Morale plummets if officers do not engender trust in the chain of command, issue incomprehensible orders, and are drunk. Fragmented morale may mitigate the possibility of a cascading collapse of morale, a culmination point.
- Poor coordination and logistical support: weak communication hampers the provision of logistical support (for example, artillery ammunition and fuel for close air support operations), which is critical to enabling not just Russian combined arms offensive operations, but also defending territory. Lack of logistical support also further drains morale. Ukrainian coordination appears by contrast fluid, allow for vertical and horizontal exchanges, integration and adaptation.
From Symptoms to Causes and Future Trends:
The current fragmented command structure reflects the political fundamentals of the Russian state. To put it another way, where power lies on the battlefield is where power in Moscow. President Putin creates checks and balances through non-institutionalized fragmentation so that groups compete against each other and he can exercise arbitration power and uphold a necessary function in the system. Added to this, the divergent competitive goals (desire to optimise revenues, recruit best personnel, define mission and narrative) of these sub-institutional actors promotes clashes. Putin’s ‘power vertical’ is a fiction.
In addition, the more entrepreneurial Russian elements formally subordinated in the chain of command all have other functions in the Putinite system which legitimises their autonomy. Kadyrov’s independent standing is seen as necessary to avoid a third Chechen war, even as Kadyrov seeks to instrumentalise involvement in the war to secure heavy weaponry for his light infantry forces, and prepare for life after Putin (his patron). Zolotov’s Rosgvardiya is all that stands between a ‘color revolution’ and the Kremlin, at least in the paranoid mindsets of Russia’s national security elite. Prigozhin’s utility stems from being a fixer – Wagner offers the possibility of quick fix solutions. Like Kadyrov, Prigozhin is a ‘conflict entrepreneur’, seeking to monetize conflict (governors outsource the training of her militias to Wagner) and privatize the profits from ‘patriotic public service’.
Prigozhin is an oligarch of the third order and lacks unlimited funds. The opaqueness regarding the military men around him and his own command structure leads to a questioning of his standing: is he a front and mouthpiece? If so, for whom? Is it the GRU? Some have speculated that it is the GRU, basing this understanding on Wagner’s genesis in 2014-15 in Donbas and Syria. However, the GRU is tasked to operate spetsnaz behind enemy lines (not in evidence in Ukraine), not police Wagner. Moreover, Prigozhin publicly denigrates the competence of Russia’s General Staff (GRU is subordinated to the GenStaff), the performance of individual Russian Generals (Lapin) and professionalism of Defense Minister Shoigu. Such verbal tirades are hardly indicative of GRU ‘control’ over Wagner. The SVR focuses on gathering political (assessing political will) and technical intelligence where it can in West and so is not a contender. The FSB’s military counter-intelligence directorate monitors the Russian military, and therefore Prigozhin and Wagner will formally at least fall under their oversight.
Russia seeks to avoid losing the war and this means dragging the conflict out to allow for reconstitution. Time therefore may institutionalize the actual current operating chain of command and improve its functioning. Russia’s reliance on a wide variety of military actors appears dysfunctional but is this offset by the benefits of greater force generation? Although mobilization should have strengthened manpower of regular army, it is not clear if this is the case. Certainly though, the regular military increases in size relative to militias, which are subsumed within it, not to say cannibalized. It is a mistake to underestimate Russian capacity to cope with dysfunctionality. It is also possible that Russia slowly learns from the Syrian example and experience of coalitional warfare: “Managing the Chechens is like getting Hezbollah to follow the plan”.
Looking to the future, current attrition rates coupled with sanctions and technology controls, suggest it will take at least 10 years to reconstitute the Russian military. How Russia reconstitutes will all depend on who is Russia’s political leader and the mission they set the military, particularly with regards Europe and Eurasia. Politics will have primacy. The reconstitution slogan may well be “build back better” but the reality will be “build back basics”, first and foremost regarding a force structure fit for purpose and a functioning chain of command.
Disclaimer: This summary reflects the views of the authors (Mark Galeotti, Pavel Baev, and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of NATO, the United States, Germany, or any other governments. GCMC, 19 October 2022.
Chain of command figures © Mark Galeotti 2022
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